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ABSTRACT 
  Courts sometimes avoid deciding contentious issues. One 
prominent justification for this practice is that, by employing avoidance 
strategically, a court can postpone reaching decisions that might 
threaten its institutional viability. Avoidance creates delay, which can 
allow for productive dialogue with and among the political branches. 
That dialogue, in turn, may result in the democratic resolution of—or 
the evolution of popular societal consensus around—a contested 
question, relieving the court of its duty. Many scholars and judges 
assume that, by creating and deferring to this dialogue, a court can 
safeguard its institutional legitimacy and security. 
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  Accepting this assumption arguendo, this Article seeks to evaluate 
avoidance as it relates to dialogue. It identifies two key factors in the 
avoidance decision that might affect dialogue with the political 
branches: first, the timing of avoidance (i.e., when in the life cycle of a 
case does a high court choose to avoid); and, second, a court’s candor 
about the decision (i.e., to what degree does a court openly 
acknowledge its choice to avoid). The Article draws on a series of 
avoidance strategies from apex courts around the world to tease out the 
relationships among timing, candor, and dialogue. As the first study to 
analyze avoidance from a comparative perspective, the Article 
generates a new framework for assessing avoidance by highlighting the 
impact of timing on the quality of dialogue, the possible unintended 
consequences of candor, and the critical trade-offs between avoidance 
and power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Alexander Bickel wrote that the United States Supreme 
Court could (and should) avoid contentious issues by finding ways not 
to decide them,1 scholars were appalled. Many argued that taking 
prudential considerations into account would undermine the 
legitimacy of the judiciary and threaten the rule of law.2 How times 
have changed! Not only have modern political science and legal theory 
demonstrated that prudential considerations are likely critical to a 
court’s legitimacy,3 but courts around the world have taken the 
Bickelian suggestion to heart.4 Avoidance is everywhere. 
What might account for courts’ burgeoning use of avoidance? The 
rise of constitutional courts and the ubiquity of rights adjudication have 
centered the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in the crosshairs 
of many political systems.5 The “countermajoritarian difficulty” that 
Bickel identified in the United States more than fifty years ago is now 
a global export: What justifies unelected judges standing in opposition 
to the elected representatives of the legislature? It may be that the 
power of judicial review—including the ability to find and remedy a 
constitutional violation—is presupposed in some systems by the 
constitutional document itself, mitigating the tension. But as recent 
events in Hungary and Poland have demonstrated,6 courts have little 
recourse when powerful political interests align against them. 
 
 1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (1962); see also 
Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 49−51 (1961). 
 2. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1964). 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See infra Parts III, IV.  
 5. See, for example, the discussion over the role of the new U.K. Supreme Court. Erin F. 
Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 543, 
582 (2014). Of course, the “countermajoritarian difficulty” can only be relevant in those systems 
in which high courts operate against a background norm of democracy and have the authority to 
engage in the types of review that generate politicized results. I thank Larry Helfer for reminding 
me of this point.  
 6. In late December 2015, the Polish Parliament passed a law reorganizing the Polish 
Constitutional Court, undermining the court’s ability to serve as a check on power. See Editorial, 
Poland’s New Right-Wing Leaders Have Crossed a Line, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/polands-new-right-wing-leaders-cross-a-line/2015/12/ 
22/54d42ea4-a8d3-11e5-8058-480b572b4aae_story.html [https://perma.cc/4UOP-T2RM]. 
Commentators immediately expressed fear for the future of the Polish court, drawing parallels 
with the experiences over the past five years in Hungary. In 2000, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court was described as “one of the most powerful courts in the world.” HERMAN SCHWARTZ, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 106 (2000); see 
also Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. L.J. 961, 973 
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Strategic avoidance—postponing decision of contentious issues 
that might threaten a court’s institutional viability—is a way of 
engaging various external actors to create and secure institutional 
support.7 Delaying a decision on substance might allow the time and 
space necessary for productive dialogue with (and within) the political 
branches to resolve the question outside of the courts. Delay may even 
allow for the evolution of popular consensus on the issue. The 
unelected judges on the court may thus be able to sidestep the difficult 
question, thereby safeguarding institutional legitimacy and security. In 
fact, courts worldwide seem to rely on the possibilities and benefits of 
extrajudicial political dialogue as a healing salve for their democratic 
deficits.8 Of course, the quality and quantity of meaningful dialogue 
may vary.9 And whether courts actually are able to protect or enhance 
their legitimacy through avoidance-based dialogue is an empirical 
question that has yet to be answered.10 But many apex courts seem to 
operate under the assumption that dialogue provides such a benefit.11  
This Article does not take a normative position on avoidance. 
Rather, by accepting avoidance as part of the judicial toolkit, it seeks 
to better understand the phenomenon and provide a new framework 
for its analysis. For the purposes of this Article, I assume that dialogue 
does enhance institutional legitimacy and security as it is often claimed 
to do.12 Thus, taking those effects as given, the Article identifies and 
 
(2011) (“The Hungarian Court was one of the first to begin work and has been handing down 
important decisions since the early 1990s. And, having had an early start, it has been unusually 
successful in gaining widespread legitimacy, despite (or perhaps as a result of) striking down one 
third of all legislation passed between 1989 and 1995, according to one estimate.”); Istvan Pogany, 
Constitutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary’s Transition to Democracy, 42 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 332, 341 (1993). Its perceived strength did not, however, insulate it from the 
political branches when a popular majority swept to power. Since 2010, when the nationalist 
FIDESZ party gained the parliamentary supermajority necessary to amend and replace 
Hungary’s 1989 Constitution, the Constitutional Court’s bench has been packed, its jurisdiction 
stripped, and its authority undermined. See The Trajectory of Democracy—Why Hungary Matters: 
Hearing Before the U.S. Comm’n on Sec. & Cooperation in Eur. (2013) (statement of Kim Lane 
Scheppele, Director, Program in Law & Pub. Affairs, Princeton Univ.), https://www.csce.gov/ 
sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Scheppelle.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4H2-
JVNX]. 
 7. See infra Part I. Of course, avoidance may also be used to achieve other aims, including 
promoting the political preferences of individual judges. See infra notes 67, 72.  
 8. See infra Part I.A. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. I thank Jeff Staton for highlighting this point and trust he will discover the answer in due 
course. 
 11. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
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assesses the variables in an avoidance decision that might contribute to 
the likelihood and quality of this dialogue. 
In Part I, I propose two identifying factors in the avoidance 
decision that might affect dialogue with the political branches: the 
timing of avoidance—when in the life cycle of a case does a high court 
choose to avoid—and the candor with which that court acknowledges 
its choice. In terms of timing, I employ a rough measure, dividing 
avoidance mechanisms into three timeframes. First, at the outset of 
litigation, ex ante mechanisms of avoidance, such as agenda-setting 
tools and justiciability doctrines, allow apex courts to avoid hearing the 
merits of cases. Second, courts use a variety of doctrinal techniques in 
the context of the merits determinations themselves—in medio 
mechanisms—to pick and choose among substantive grounds or to 
sequence questions in a way to avoid deciding certain issues. Third, 
courts may hear and decide contentious issues but then avoid 
articulating a remedy, an ex post mechanism that can be used to 
“remand” issues to the political branches for input. Candor, in turn, 
falls along a spectrum as developed through the comparative examples 
in the Article. It ranges from a court’s express avoidance because of 
articulated institutional legitimacy reasons, to its complete refusal to 
decide without offering any explanation at all.13 
How do the timing of and candor about an avoidance decision 
affect the quality and likelihood of the resulting dialogue? The heart of 
this Article provides a series of comparative examples to begin to tease 
out these relationships. The analysis also tracks possible unintended 
consequences of avoidance for the institutional interests of a court. I 
examine four jurisdictions, categorized into the three timeframes for 
avoidance noted above. Although of course any individual court may 
choose to avoid at different times in different cases, each court 
nevertheless operates against a backdrop of powers, norms, or 
historical events that makes certain timing choices more likely. With 
this perspective, I review the ex ante agenda-setting and justiciability 
tools used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Part II; the in medio doctrinal 
innovation of the “margin of appreciation,” developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Part III; and the ex post remedial 
constructs relied upon by the Constitutional Court of South Africa and 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Part IV. 
 
 13. See infra Parts II–IV.  
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As the first study to analyze avoidance from a comparative 
perspective, this Article sheds light on various methods of avoidance 
and explores the relationships among timing, candor, and dialogue. But 
it does not seek to predict particular instances of avoidance; the study 
of this phenomenon is too new to say whether, in a given type of case, 
a court will choose to avoid, and whether it will do so with a particular 
degree of candor.14 Future research can build on the empirically based 
advances in this Article to develop a theory of when one might expect 
avoidance to be used in various systems. As a start, I would emphasize 
that the courts addressed here have rights-adjudication responsibilities 
and function within diverse democratic-based systems. And in the 
Article’s final Part, I suggest additional factors that may affect the 
likelihood of avoidance, including the internal institutional dynamics 
of a court, the judicial architecture of the legal system, and how well 
judges can be expected to understand and predict political threats or 
popular support. 
Part V also clarifies the trade-offs between the different models of 
avoidance, and it highlights the role candor plays in the development 
of dialogue. In reviewing the choices made by the various courts 
described in Parts II–IV, it seems possible that the later and more 
candid the avoidance, the more likely that dialogue among the 
branches of government will be a meaningful conversation rather than 
parallel soliloquys. Of course, there are also potential unintended 
consequences of particularly candid avoidance.15 Candor about judicial 
weakness may increase institutional security at the cost of institutional 
power. If a court is known to defer to the public’s will, can it fulfill its 
role as the protector of minority rights or maintain the aspiration (let 
alone the actuality) of countermajoritarian constitutionalism?16 
 
 14. And, of course, it is possible that some courts do not use avoidance at all—perhaps 
because they have not been entrusted with contentious issues to adjudicate or perhaps because 
they no longer need the flexibility that avoidance provides.  
 15. Cf. David Landau, Aggressive Weak-Form Remedies, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 244, 263 (2014) 
(discussing benefits of comparative work for “clarifying . . . trade-offs”). 
 16. In the United States, critics of the “rhetoric of heroic countermajoritarianism” argue that 
the Supreme Court has never truly been able to prevent “majoritarian overreaching.” Michael J. 
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1996); 
see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 15 (2009) (arguing that judges rarely 
decide “contrary to the popular will”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE 
ALTAR 207 (2013) (noting the Supreme Court’s majoritarian tendencies: once public opinion has 
shifted in favor of a particular position, the Supreme Court “will constitutionalize the emerging 
consensus and suppress resisting outliers”); Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage 
Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 160 (2013) (same) [hereinafter Klarman, 
Windsor and Brown]. But these criticisms often struggle to disentangle what the Court has done 
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Assuming that avoidance—through dialogue—enhances legitimacy, 
perhaps avoidance should also be assessed for its effect on a court’s 
retained potential for exercising that legitimacy.17 
I.  ANALYZING AVOIDANCE 
This Part takes a first cut at a schema for analyzing avoidance by 
identifying its purported benefit: delay allowing for dialogue. Although 
dialogue is widely touted by academics as a means of defanging the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and preventing backlash against a court, 
there is little empirical evidence demonstrating that dialogue (or delay) 
is actually linked to increasing or maintaining a court’s legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, dialogic engagement has been embraced by many courts 
and, for purposes of this Article, is assumed to benefit those courts. If 
dialogue is a goal of avoidance, it then becomes necessary to assess 
those factors that might impact the quality and nature of that dialogue. 
The Part next discusses two possible variables: the timing of the 
avoidance (the stage in the evolution of a case at which a high court 
chooses to avoid) and the candor with which that court makes its 
decision (how clearly the court acknowledges its strategic choice to 
avoid). 
A. Delay and Dialogue 
Alexander Bickel advocated for avoidance as a mechanism of 
strategic consideration. His core insight was identifying the Supreme 
Court’s institutional need “to ensure survival and to operate 
efficiently.”18 At the time he articulated these ideas, theorists saw 
 
from what it has the capacity to do. See FRIEDMAN, supra, at 370 (“[T]he expressions of both the 
hope and the threat of judicial review rest on a common supposition: that the judiciary even has 
the capacity of running contrary to the will of the majority.”); see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 6 (2004) (“Judges who generally reflect popular opinion are 
unlikely to have the inclination, and they may well lack the capacity, to defend minority rights 
from majoritarian invasion.”). It may be that the Supreme Court improperly deploys or otherwise 
fails to use the power it has acquired. But it does seek to maintain the countermajoritarian 
aspiration, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992) (plurality 
opinion), at least in appearance, even if its achievement is sometimes in doubt. 
 17. Cf. THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE 72–111 (2013) (outlining an analytical 
framework for assessing legitimacy as a means to be used by courts, with varying efficacy); JAMES 
L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY 
THEORY AND JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 158 (2009) (“Understanding how 
institutions acquire and spend legitimacy remains one of the most important unanswered 
questions for those interested in the power and influence of judicial institutions.” ).  
 18. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 213 (1968); cf. Barry Friedman, The 
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neutral principles of law and “rigorous standards of principled 
adjudication” as the only way to protect and develop institutional 
legitimacy.19 Considering institutional capacity, political pressure, and 
social change was outside the scope of what it meant to be a court and 
to apply the legal method. But scholarship by political scientists and 
lawyers has since suggested that high courts do (and often must) take 
expediency into account, not in spite of its impact on legitimacy, but 
precisely because strategic considerations can promote legitimacy.20 
Legitimacy is a multifaceted concept, and by disaggregating its 
elements, scholars have shown that both principle and pragmatism are 
necessary to its maintenance.21 At bottom, a court’s institutional or 
sociological legitimacy,22 determined by a mixture of compliance and 
enforcement in the face of substantive disagreement,23 is different from 
 
Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 
YALE L.J. 153, 201 (2002) (describing the “Lincolnian tension” between principle and pragmatism 
as “the central metaphor for [Bickel’s] book”). 
 19. Gunther, supra note 2, at 22. 
 20. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Role of Strategic Reasoning in Constitutional Interpretation: 
In Defense of the Pathological Perspective, 1986 DUKE L.J. 696, 697 (asserting that functional 
effectiveness is based on a series of strategic calculations).  
 21. For simplicity, the normative legitimacy of the law itself will be assumed, but this is 
another aspect of judicial legitimacy that garners attention from political theorists and lawyers 
alike. See Andreas Føllesdal, The Legitimacy Deficits of the Human Rights Judiciary: Elements 
and Implications of a Normative Theory, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 339, 345 (2013) 
(discussing normative legitimacy); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1817–27 (2005) (discussing substantive legal legitimacy); Michael L. 
Wells, ‘Sociological Legitimacy’ in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1017–
31 (2007) (discussing moral legitimacy). 
 22. See Fallon, supra note 21, at 1828 (discussing sociological legitimacy); Wells, supra note 
21, at 1017–31 (same).  
 23. Because people’s willingness to accept a judgment is complicated by their own normative 
or cultural commitments, see Dan M. Kahan, Cognitive Bias and the Constitution, 88 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 367, 394 (2013) (“The distorting effect of cultural cognition on public perceptions of 
constitutional decision-making subverts legitimacy: . . . the enforcement of constitutional law 
itself multiplies the occasions in which the adherents to competing moral outlooks experience law 
as denigrating their cultural identities.”); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, 
Danieli Evans & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 887 (2012) (“[I]f legal decisionmakers’ own ability to 
weigh the proffered evidence is affected by motivated cognition, they will do a poor, or at least a 
suspect, job of distinguishing pretext from truth.”), they are susceptible to the pitfalls of motivated 
reasoning. Scholarship suggests that if an individual agrees with the outcome of a case, she may 
be indifferent to the reasoning. See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial 
Decision Making, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 709, 719 (2011). But if she disagrees with the 
decision on the merits, she may be more likely to believe it was an impermissibly politicized result 
regardless of the reasoning. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, 
The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 
33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 537, 539, 546–47 (2003); cf. Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They 
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the legal legitimacy found in its decisions.24 Some measure of each is 
essential.25 Understanding a court’s institutional legitimacy as a distinct 
concept gives support to the idea that judges may act to enhance or 
protect that legitimacy apart from (or in a manner distinguishable 
from) a focus on the substantive legitimacy of their opinions. 
Protecting institutional or sociological legitimacy is therefore “an 
additional goal that high court justices pursue and that affects 
disposition of individual cases.”26 Strategic legitimacy cultivation 
should be an expected factor in judicial decisionmaking.27 
 
Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 132 (1954) (finding that 
students demonstrated unconscious bias in favor of their home school when evaluating referee 
decisions in a taped football game). In a world of motivated reasoning and cultural dissensus, legal 
legitimacy must function within a broader social legitimacy. A broader sociological or institutional 
legitimacy permits contingent compliance: people will comply with a decision, even when they 
disagree with its substance and believe it was politicized, because they believe (1) that others 
believe it necessary to comply and (2) that these others will comply in the future when the decision 
goes against them. See Føllesdal, supra note 21, at 350; see also Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra, 
at 537 (discussing “institutional loyalty, support not contingent upon satisfaction with the 
immediate outputs of the institution”). 
 24. Fallon, supra note 21, at 1828. Legal legitimacy is the application of neutral principles of 
law, taking modern shape in at least four distinct jurisprudential developments: (1) the use of 
precedents in constructing arguments and bringing cases, see generally CHARLES R. EPP, THE 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (1998) (constructing arguments); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare 
Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018 (1996) (same), (2) the “distinctive jurisprudential categories or 
doctrines” that “have influenced voting and opinion writing,” see Howard Gillman, What’s Law 
Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 481 (2001) (collecting sources), (3) constraints on judges based on their 
earlier articulations of principles, cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 1733, 1760 (2003) (discussing the path dependency of precedent); see generally LEE 
EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY (1992) (arguing that the strength of legal arguments has at least as much 
impact on judicial decisions as public opinion and Justices’ political beliefs), and (4) claims of 
legitimacy through consistency, see Yonatan Lupu & Erik Voeten, Precedent in International 
Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European Court of Human Rights, 42 BRIT. 
J. POL. SCI. 413, 413 (2011). 
 25. Of course, there will always be those for whom contingent compliance to immoral results 
is anathema, even when the decisions are embedded in a liberal constitutional state.  
 26. Vuk Radmilovic, Between Activism and Restraint: Institutional Legitimacy, Strategic 
Decision Making and the Supreme Court of Canada 10 (2011) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Toronto), https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/31908/1/Radmilovic_ 
Vuk_201111_PhD_thesis.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L5K-UKLF]. 
 27. See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107, 
1139 (1995) (“[I]n order for the Court to be able to justifiably compel compliance with its rulings 
in particular cases it must be effective enough to compel compliance with its pronouncements 
generally. Therefore, if the Court can protect its effectiveness through safeguarding its image, the 
Court ought to do so.”).  
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Avoidance is a means of cultivating this legitimacy. A court can 
simply avoid deciding contentious, politically divisive issues that, by 
creating powerful opponents with the capacity to rein in (or oppose) 
the court’s actions, could threaten its institutional legitimacy. The 
benefit of this strategy, of course, is delay: by postponing a difficult 
decision until popular opinion shifts or a solution can be developed 
through the political branches, the court would not have to take 
responsibility for imposing a new rule on a reluctant populace or 
opposing elites.  
The key element in effectuating these benefits of delay is the 
dialogic possibility in avoiding adjudication.28 Bickel himself 
highlighted the importance of promoting dialogue, suggesting that the 
Supreme Court use its rhetorical capacity to “explain the principle that 
is in play and praise it,” without either accepting or denying the 
underlying right at issue.29 In this way, the Court could engage the 
democratic branches in the enterprise of articulating and defining 
national rights.30 
Judicial dialogue has become the preferred response to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, leading to a robust literature and 
recommendations for dialogic practices in courts around the world.31 
The contours of dialogue theory have been drawn and redrawn over 
the past fifty years.32 And the “language of dialogue is often used to 
describe very different theories of cooperative constitutionalism, each 
embracing a different understanding of the appropriate scope of the 
judicial and legislative roles.”33 
Efforts to use dialogue theory to justify judicial review or to 
explain the relationship between a court and a legislature are often 
 
 28. Cf. Bickel, supra note 1, at 64 (“The Court in the Birth Control Cases engaged in a sort 
of colloquy with the political institutions, begun by way of questions and answers at the argument, 
stylized and brought to a Socratic conclusion in the prevailing opinion. The upshot was the 
framing of conditions to invite a responsible legislative decision.”). 
 29. Id. at 77. 
 30. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 
(1970) (“Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of 
conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives.”). 
 31. See Kent Roach, Dialogic Judicial Review and Its Critics, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2d 49 (2004) 
(summarizing the literature). But see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 577, 653–57 (1993) (questioning the existence of a countermajoritarian difficulty because 
the Supreme Court is inherently in dialogue with the political branches and people); Friedman, 
supra note 18, at 198–200 (explaining relevant additions to academic criticism of the Court). 
 32. See generally Roach, supra note 31 (reviewing the theory). 
 33. Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus 
Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 393–94 (2007).  
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driven by normative aims to ensure robust rights elaboration.34 For 
example, Rosalind Dixon argues that, although the theory recognizes 
“limits to both judicial competence and responsiveness in the process 
of constitutional rights adjudication,”35 it nevertheless provides a 
justification for judicial participation in rights elaboration. Courts, she 
argues, have a “greater capacity and responsibility to counter 
legislative blockages to the realization of constitutional rights.”36 It is 
by countering legislative blind spots and burdens of inertia that courts 
contribute to “the legitimacy of the constitutional system as a whole.”37 
In contrast to these outcome-oriented justifications, structural 
definitions of dialogue focus on institutional design. Kent Roach builds 
on the Canadian experience with iterative analysis of rights by courts 
and legislatures to argue that “dialogue” may now be understood to 
refer “to any constitutional design that allows rights, as contained in a 
bill of rights and as interpreted by the courts, to be limited or 
overridden by the ordinary legislation of a democratically elected 
legislature.”38 But this institutional description provides little guidance 
for navigating the intersection between dialogue and the judicial role. 
Even in Canada, judges “have disagreed about the meaning of 
dialogue, with some stressing that it cannot be an excuse for an 
abdication of an anti-majoritarian judicial role . . . and others 
suggesting that it requires judges to defer when Parliament expresses 
reasonable disagreement with the Court’s reconciliation of individual 
and social interests.”39 
Whether proffering outcome-driven or design-based definitions, 
scholars defending or advocating dialogue participate in a literature 
shaped by the core Bickelian assumption that dialogue can benefit a 
court’s institutional legitimacy.40 But empirical political scientists have 
not yet engaged in this analysis, and some building blocks key to 
understanding the effectiveness of dialogue—“when and why 
 
 34. Id. at 394. 
 35. Id. at 393. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 404–05.  
 38. Roach, supra note 31, at 55.  
 39. Id. at 50.  
 40. Critics continue to question whether “dialogue” has independent purchase such that it 
could provide a metric to judges for deciding hard cases. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 31, at 51; 
Earl M. Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 
375, 386–87 (1988). 
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legislatures accept certain judicial decisions”41—are relatively 
unexplored. Further, even assuming that dialogue functions as a 
release valve that provides courts with leverage and space to protect 
their institutional and sociological legitimacy, there is not yet a sense 
of what kind of dialogue is best suited to that ultimate aim. 
B. The Variables of Timing and Candor 
Accepting arguendo that courts take strategic considerations into 
account and that, by allowing for dialogue, there is a purported benefit 
in so doing, a central question remains: How? Two key variables are at 
play in the mechanism of avoidance: timing, or when to avoid in the 
evolution of a case; and candor, or the degree to which the court openly 
acknowledges its strategic choice to avoid. The issue of timing has not 
been addressed in the literature, but this Article begins to fill this gap. 
Parts II–IV examine avoidance mechanisms used at different stages in 
the lifespan of a case and discuss how the timing of avoidance may 
affect the nature of the dialogue that can ensue. This Section, in turn, 
discusses the second major variable: candor. 
The role of candor has been discussed in the context of avoidance, 
as Bickel himself was roundly criticized for advocating the “covert 
deployment” of prudential considerations.42 The question presented 
here is whether a court should admit that it is acting strategically. 
Should a court acknowledge its weakness or its unwillingness to make 
a difficult decision? How candid should a court be about its decision to 
avoid? 
The literature on candor suggests it has a distinct normative status 
in law, but it is one that is often assumed rather than explicated.43 Legal 
scholars often assert candor’s importance without engaging in any of 
the moral reasoning such a claim entails—viewing it as a “self-evident 
truth of uncompromising importance.”44 Is candor inherently desirable 
either as an end or as a means? Nonconsequentialist arguments are 
 
 41. Roach, supra note 31, at 52. 
 42. Hellman, supra note 27, at 1123. 
 43. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 400 
(1989) (describing the pro-candor literature).  
 44. Id.  
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rarely embraced or even properly presented.45 The literature mostly 
focuses on the harms of lying rather than truth as a moral absolute.46 
Most scholars make the more pragmatic claim that deception, 
whether through employing legal fictions or by hiding the true 
rationale for a doctrinal development, “undermines the integrity of the 
judiciary.”47 This argument rests on two core values that are thought to 
promote legitimacy: publicity and trust. 
The principle of publicity—or public reason-giving—allows for 
notice, guidance, and prediction, all essential to the rule of law.48 At a 
broad level of generality, this public reason-giving is a way of ensuring 
accountability,49 allowing for meaningful democratic checks on 
power.50 But accountability in the context of judicial processes is 
complicated, as political oversight threatens judicial independence.51 
Without providing a more contextualized institutional analysis, some 
scholars have simply agreed that candor “acts as a prophylactic; the 
requirement of publicity insures that the reasons on which decisions 
are based are at least minimally acceptable to the public.”52 Minimally 
acceptable reason-giving, however, is not a robust conception of the 
rule of law. 
The second value tied to candor is trust. Put simply, suspicion 
undermines coordination.53 Without candor, the world would be one of 
unresolved prisoner’s dilemmas,54 undermining not only the rule of law 
 
 45. But see Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers 
Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1110 n.63 (2010) (discussing Kant’s analysis of whether truth is a 
moral absolute). 
 46. See id. at 1110–11; Zeppos, supra note 43, at 405. 
 47. See, e.g., Zeppos, supra note 43, at 401. 
 48. See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1005–12 (2008); see also 
Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1358 (1995) 
(discussing notice); Cohen, supra note 45, at 1112–15 (discussing guidance); Zeppos, supra note 
43, at 401 (discussing predictability).  
 49. See Idleman, supra note 48, at 1335–45. 
 50. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 1100; David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987). It is also an indication that citizens are rational actors, “capable 
of understanding and responding to the reasons that justify the rules by which they are governed.” 
Schwartzman, supra note 48, at 1004. 
 51. See Erin F. Delaney, Searching for Constitutional Meaning in Institutional Design: The 
Debate over Judicial Appointments in the United Kingdom, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 752, 753 (2016). 
 52. Hellman, supra note 27, at 1143. 
 53. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 1112 (discussing coordination problems); Shapiro, supra 
note 50, at 737 (“In a society that placed no special value on truthfulness, all cooperative 
undertakings would be difficult or impossible.”).  
 54. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1112.  
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but all societal organization. Even if the rationale for judicial candor 
were to be relaxed in certain circumstances, a background norm of 
truthfulness is essential, as David Shapiro rightly notes, for “deception 
loses its point if it is not believed.”55 
Notwithstanding the strong presumption in favor of judicial 
candor,56 there are, of course, countervailing pragmatic, strategic, and 
even normative interests.57 Pragmatic concerns in multimember courts 
suggest that the benefits of achieving a majority opinion might cut in 
favor of some amount of opaque compromise.58 In fact, majority 
coalition size may affect both acceptance of and compliance with a 
court’s decision.59 In addition, a strategic account would suggest it 
might be acceptable to misrepresent in order to achieve another good, 
such as secrecy or national security.60 Guido Calabresi and Philip 
Bobbitt have suggested that subterfuge might be warranted by the 
tragic nature of a clash between competing values.61 Indeed, as 
Calabresi has separately noted, “The most important . . . kind of 
subterfuge is that designed to hide a fundamental value conflict, 
 
 55. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 737.  
 56. Hellman, supra note 27, at 1142; see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE 
OF STATUTES 177 (1982) (“The burden must be on those who would argue for indirection.”). 
 57. Many scholars also discuss the practical difficulties of operationalizing an obligation or 
duty of judicial candor: Scott Idleman proposes a definition of candor that requires “full 
disclosure of relevant information.” Idleman, supra note 48, at 1316. Of course, the devil is in the 
details—the meanings of “full,” “disclosure,” “relevant,” and even “information.” Id. Mathilde 
Cohen also discusses the challenges of imposing an internalist understanding of sincerity, 
requiring a “congruence between actual motives and stated reasons.” Cohen, supra note 45, at 
1122–32. 
 58. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2311 (1999) (“Practical reasoning is an art, guided by a commitment to 
constructing viable solutions to problems. This entails both a commitment to compromise and to 
the civility of discourse.”); see also Cohen, supra note 45, at 1146–48 (discussing reason-giving in 
multimember contexts); Shapiro, supra note 50, at 736, 742–43 (“Surely it is not deceptive for a 
majority to adopt a rationale that does not go as far as some of its members are willing to go.”). 
But see James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept 
Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 
POL. RES. Q. 187, 197 (2005) (finding little evidence for the proposition that “sharp splits in Court 
decisions substantially delegitimized those outcomes”).  
 59. See Michael F. Salamone, Judicial Consensus and Public Opinion: Conditional Response 
to Supreme Court Majority Size, 67 POL. RES. Q. 320, 332 (2014) (finding that “ex ante opponents 
of the Court’s policies may be persuaded to accept judicial decisions with which they disagree. 
The presence and dynamics of this effect, however, appear to be contingent on the salience of the 
policy under review,” with low salience cases getting the biggest boost from unanimity). 
 60. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 1117–19 (discussing strategic reasons in favor of secrecy and 
security).  
 61. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (arguing 
that subterfuges can be used to hide value conflicts).  
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recognition of which would be too destructive for the particular society 
to accept.”62 Is hiding a decision to avoid—and thereby sidestepping a 
fundamental value conflict—an acceptable subterfuge? 
Ultimately, the arguments for and against candor are not situated 
in empirical analysis of the effects of candor, and it is difficult to assess 
the benefits or harms only as a theoretical matter. But any analysis of 
avoidance should closely examine how candid a court is being about 
the scope of its own power and its choices to use or abjure that power. 
Candor is likely to have an impact on the avoidance calculus by 
affecting the quality or quantity of dialogue. If a court is candid about 
avoiding an issue because of its politicized nature, the court may be 
able to encourage dialogue with or among the political branches on the 
subject. But promoting dialogue may come at a cost; candor could also 
serve to undermine the court’s effective authority. If a court is known 
to avoid politically divisive issues, it may lose its authority to decide 
controversial cases. The public may be reluctant to accept decisions in 
such cases if it has come to expect avoidance (especially if doctrinal 
evolution seems to require avoidance). If a court cannot ever decide a 
case in a countermajoritarian direction, can it fulfill its function? What 
use is its accrual of legitimacy, if it can never be expended?63 
*   *   * 
The next three Parts explore how courts in different jurisdictions 
have balanced these variables of timing and candor in their efforts to 
delay contentious decisions. Although any individual court may rely 
upon any or all of the various methods of avoidance, certain courts 
have preferred approaches that best exemplify avoidance at a 
particular time in the life-cycle of a case. Part II reviews the ex ante 
mechanisms used by the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid deciding merits 
issues altogether. Part III looks at how the European Court of Human 
 
 62. CALABRESI, supra note 56, at 172.  
 63. Alexis de Tocqueville observed the interplay between power and legitimacy at a time 
when the Supreme Court played a much smaller role in American life:  
In the hands of seven federal judges rest ceaselessly the peace, the prosperity, the very 
existence of the Union. . . . Their power is immense; but it is a power of opinion. They 
are omnipotent as long as the people consent to obey the law; they can do nothing when 
they scorn it. Now, the power of opinion is that which is most difficult to make use of, 
because it is impossible to say exactly where its limits are. It is often as dangerous to 
fall short of them as to exceed them. 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 142 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1835). 
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Rights deploys doctrinal tools in medio to avoid deciding certain merits 
issues. And Part IV discusses how the South African Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court of Canada allow the merits questions to 
be raised and answered but use remedies, ex post, to parry, delay, and 
engage the political branches in the matter of redress. 
II.  EX ANTE: AGENDA SETTING AND JUSTICIABILITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The twenty-first century Supreme Court has the power and 
authority to declare laws unconstitutional and the sociological 
legitimacy to engender compliance. This judicial supremacy developed 
over decades with many contributing factors,64 including, inter alia, the 
Court’s use of a set of doctrinal and discretionary mechanisms to avoid 
deciding contentious constitutional questions. Noting the Court’s 
emerging reliance on these techniques in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
Alexander Bickel called them the “passive virtues.”65 
In Bickel’s original invocation of the term, he focused on 
justiciability doctrines, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness.66 
These “virtues” allowed the Court to avoid hearing the merits of a case, 
ex ante. Of course, the Court has a wider range of avoidance tools it 
can deploy. Some come into play during the disposition of a case (in 
medio), such as immunity doctrines, deference doctrines, and the most 
obvious—the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.67 And there are 
famous examples of remedial avoidance (ex post)—Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown II)’s68 “all deliberate speed” phrasing leaps to mind.  
 
 64. See generally Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal 
Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (2011) (discussing theories of 
judicial supremacy and proposing one of their own).  
 65. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 79. 
 66. Id. at 111–98.  
 67. Of course, the modern Supreme Court is extremely powerful, and some of these 
doctrines may no longer be used to avoid divisive issues in the Bickelian sense but rather to 
structure preferred outcomes for certain Justices over time. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & 
Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015) (describing how the Court uses doctrines like generative avoidance and 
its rewriting power to bring forth legal change); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, 
Agenda Control and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 669 (2012) (“Current doctrinal 
developments reflect a powerful drive to ensure that . . . the Court possess[es] wide-ranging 
agenda-setting freedom to determine what issues are to be . . . decided.”). See generally WALTER 
F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (discussing and evaluating the judge as 
“policy-maker”). 
 68. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301. An unusual American example that 
resonates with later ex post remedial approaches used in Canada and South Africa is Northern 
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This Part, however, focuses on the Court’s extraordinary ex ante 
toolkit, which has only expanded since Bickel first identified the 
passive virtues.69 The Court now controls its own agenda through its 
discretionary power of certiorari and its ability to dismiss cases as 
improvidently granted (DIG), and it still retains the flexibility to avoid 
merits issues by using the justiciability doctrines that Bickel highlighted 
years ago. The U.S. Supreme Court has an unrivaled ability to decide 
“whether, when and how much to adjudicate,”70 marking its powerful 
ex ante avoidance techniques as exceptional in a global context.71 But 
the Court rarely acknowledges its use of these mechanisms for 
avoidance purposes, opting for silence rather than a candid statement 
of its uncertainty or unwillingness to insert itself into a heated political 
debate. And it is possible that this preference for opacity may limit the 
Court’s influence in ongoing debate. 
A. Certiorari and DIGs 
An observer today might remark that, given its ability to choose 
its cases, the Court should have little need for other avoidance 
techniques. Certainly, the certiorari power gives the Court tremendous 
agenda-setting capacity. And the most obvious way to avoid 
adjudicating the merits of a difficult and contentious constitutional 
claim is to avoid hearing it in the first place. 
 
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. There, the Supreme Court found that 28 
U.S.C. § 1471, which granted broad jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts, was unconstitutional 
but nevertheless stayed its judgment for four months to “afford Congress an opportunity to 
reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication,” N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1981).  
 69. The Supreme Court in the 1950s had limited docket control. Since that time, the Court’s 
discretionary docket has been expanded, see Supreme Court Case Selections Act, Pub. L. No. 
100-352 (1988), and its mandatory appellate (non-original) jurisdiction has now largely 
disappeared, with a few small exceptions, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (2012) (providing for, upon 
the request of the Attorney General, a three-judge panel to be created to hear a case of “general 
public importance” under the Civil Rights Act with the Supreme Court having mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction); 52 U.S.C. § 10101(g) (providing for a similar process, including mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, in cases under the Voting Rights Act when the 
Attorney General requests a “finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination”); Michael E. 
Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the 
Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 768–69 (2007) (generally discussing the direct appeal process 
of election law cases after adjudication by a three-judge panel).  
 70. Bickel, supra note 1, at 79; see also Deutsch, supra note 18, at 204 (noting that these 
doctrines, “by deciding jurisdiction, simultaneously determine the timing and impact of judicial 
decisions”). 
 71. See infra Parts III, IV.  
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It seems plausible that the Justices use their discretionary power 
in such a strategic manner.72 As an historical matter, careful statistical 
study of certiorari votes based on the private papers of several of the 
Justices has shown that “strategic voting does take place on a routine 
basis, though in conjunction with identifiable nonstrategic factors.”73 It 
is often difficult to determine when strategy is in play: as H.W. Perry 
wrote, “[A]ll of the justices act strategically on cert. at times, and much 
of the time none of them acts strategically.”74 
Yet, even if strategizing at the filtering stage, a Justice might 
miscalculate the expected positions of her colleagues or overlook a 
complicating element in the case. Sometimes these miscues can lead 
the Court to DIG. The Court can DIG an action even after briefing 
and oral argument, and scholarship suggests that “the Court is more 
likely to DIG cases raising constitutional issues,” a result “consistent 
with the view that the Court might prefer to avoid resolving cases on 
constitutional grounds, or avoid such cases altogether.”75 
The notable quality of both the denial of certiorari and the DIG is 
the Court’s practice of providing little explanation or justification for 
the action. The Court is decidedly not candid about its reasoning, and 
this lack of candor obscures the Court’s ultimate motivations. 
Commentators chide the Court for this obfuscation, claiming that it has 
 
 72. This Article focuses on strategic behavior designed to avoid difficult decisions. 
Commentators have argued that the modern Supreme Court may also engage in strategic 
behavior at the agenda-setting stage to seek out issues that motivated Justices may wish to decide. 
Cf. Monaghan, supra note 67, at 679 (“The Court seeks as much freedom as possible over what is 
to be finally and authoritatively decided.”).  
 73. Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An Empirical and 
Institutional Analysis, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1421, 1455–56; see also Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. 
Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 
15 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 549, 550 (1999) (“[J]ustices engage in sophisticated voting, defined as 
looking forward to the decision on the merits and acting with that potential outcome in mind, and 
do so in a wide range of circumstances.”). 
 74. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 198 (1991); see also Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court 
Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson 
Court, 57 J. POL. 824, 825 (1995) (“The extent to which Supreme Court justices actually are 
strategic or forward looking in their certiorari votes is not at all clear. No two scholars of 
individual voting strategies on certiorari have taken the same position.”). 
 75. Solimine & Gely, supra note 73, at 1436; id. at 1456–58 (noting “anecdotal accounts of 
DIGging used for seemingly strategic purposes,” and discussing the Court’s decision to DIG in 
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955), as arguably driven by the 
Court’s desire “to avoid the political heat that it might generate were it to decide the case on the 
merits”). 
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a practical impact.76 For example, when “lower-court judges don’t 
know why the Supreme Court does what it does, they sometimes divide 
sharply when forced to interpret the court’s nonpronouncements.”77 
This uncertainty among trained legal minds is reflected and amplified 
in the uncertain potential for political dialogue. 
When the Court fails to explain its refusal to hear a case, its silence 
leaves political actors unable to predict what future action the Court 
expects or will accept from them. The Court’s December 2015 decision 
to deny certiorari in an Illinois case, Friedman v. City of Highland 
Park,78 which upheld a ban on assault weapons, provides a useful 
example. Friedman followed two rulings, District of Columbia v. 
Heller79 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,80 in which the Court 
interpreted the Second Amendment to ensure the right “to keep and 
bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the 
home.”81 In his dissent from the denial in Friedman, Justice Thomas, 
joined by Justice Scalia, excoriated the Court for refusing “to review a 
decision that flouts two of our Second Amendment precedents,” 
particularly given the Court’s “willingness to summarily reverse courts 
that disregard our other constitutional decisions.”82 
What are observers to make of this result? The denial of certiorari 
came a few days after the mass shooting in San Bernardino, California. 
Was this just a difficult and politically fraught time to take another 
Second Amendment case? Or did the other Justices in the McDonald 
plurality decide not to vote to hear the case because of principled 
uncertainty about the extent of Second Amendment constitutional 
protections? Should municipalities see this as an invitation to regulate 
guns or as a short reprieve before the Court again takes up the Second 
Amendment?83 Is the Court inviting dialogue or not? The lack of 
transparency makes it impossible to tell. 
 
 76. See, e.g., William Baude, The Supreme Court’s Secret Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, 
at A23 (arguing for transparency in the Court’s orders docket, drawing on William Baude, 
Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2015)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015). 
 79. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 80. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 81. Id. at 780. 
 82. Friedman, 136 S. Ct at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
 83. See Cristian Farias, Supreme Court Rejects Major 2nd Amendment Case, and Justice 
Thomas Has a Fit, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/major-secondamendmentcase_56659b12e4b079b2818f2118 [https://perma.cc/YW9N-
RVMQ] (discussing ways to interpret the denial of certiorari). 
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B. Standing 
Of course, repeatedly dodging an issue at the certiorari stage or 
failing to calendar a case that raises a pressing question of federal law 
may give the impression of weakness or fear. Thus, even with docket 
control, the Court may nevertheless feel pressure to hear cases that 
could present threats to its institutional security.84 Bickel argued that 
justiciability doctrines, such as prudential standing, offer a means of 
neutralizing these threats.85 He advocated a discretionary “Power to 
Decline the Exercise of Jurisdiction Which is Given,” exercised most 
often (though not always) by finding disputes nonjusticiable.86 
Early uses of Bickelian jurisdictional dodges were notable for 
appearing strategic on their face. For example, in Naim v. Naim,87 a 
case before it on mandatory jurisdiction, the Court avoided deciding 
whether a Virginia antimiscegenation statute violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.88 The direction of the Court’s jurisprudence on the issue 
was clear and the question of principle undisputed: the law was 
unconstitutional.89 But if the Court overturned the law, the Justices 
feared risking social upheaval and threatening the enforcement of 
 
 84. These avoidance tools—certiorari, DIGs, standing, ripeness, mootness—address timing: 
when can a particular claim be heard by the Court? A decision that a party bringing the claim 
lacks standing does not preclude a future, properly placed litigant from bringing the same 
underlying claim. The underlying issue is one for the Court to decide, but not between these 
parties, at this time. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1364 (1973). These timing-related virtues are distinct from another often-
discussed passive virtue: the political question doctrine. This doctrine is (at least ostensibly) a 
determination by the Court that an issue has been constitutionally delegated to another branch 
for decision. Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1908, 1923–24 (2015). But when the Court has decided to cede an area to the political 
branches, it struggles to reclaim that ground, thus making recourse to the doctrine less likely. See 
Note, Political Rights as Political Questions: The Paradox of Luther v. Borden, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1125, 1134–35 (1987) (discussing the Republican Guarantee clause).  
 85. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 111–98. 
 86. Id. at 127.  
 87. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 
(1956). 
 88. Id. at 849–50; see Bickel, supra note 1, at 46 n.34; see also BICKEL, supra note 1, at 71, 174 
(stating that the Court found no difficulty in allowing the constitutional question to remain 
unresolved).  
 89. Gunther, supra note 2, at 23–24; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). 
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Brown v. Board of Education.90 The Court dismissed the case for failing 
to present a federal question.91 
Commentators easily recognized the subterfuge: as Gerald 
Gunther wrote, if, as Brown taught, “race is a forbidden criterion, then 
miscegenation laws are invalid, no matter what the reaction of 
Southern opinion might be.”92 And Herbert Wechsler considered the 
Court’s dismissal of the appeal as “wholly without basis in the law.”93 
Because of the procedural posture of the case and the Court’s obvious 
choice to avoid the merits, Naim presented the trade-off between 
principle and expediency in its starkest form.94 
In recent cases, whether the “passive virtues” are in use is a more 
complicated question. First, the Court might not know the “right” 
answer: “The laws involved might be moving toward 
unconstitutionality (as our notions of basic rights changed) and yet not 
be invalid.”95 In fact, today’s cases more often present competing or 
contentious claims of principle to ideologically divided Justices.96 
 
 90. See Klarman, Windsor and Brown, supra note 16, at 147–48 (stating that Justice 
Frankfurter was worried about “thwarting or seriously handicapping the enforcement of 
[Brown]” (alteration in original)). 
 91. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the application of an anti-miscegenation statute 
to annul the marriage between a white man and a Chinese woman, concluding in its opinion that 
nothing “in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, or in any other provision of that 
great document, any words or any intendment [would] prohibit the State from enacting legislation 
to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens.” Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), 
vacated, 350 U.S. 891(1955) (per curiam). The Supreme Court had mandatory jurisdiction over 
the case; it vacated and remanded the case for further development of the record, in a two-
sentence per curiam decision. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam). On remand, 
the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that it had “no provision . . . by which this court may 
send the cause back to the Circuit Court with directions to re-open the cause so decided, gather 
additional evidence and render a new decision.” Naim, 90 S.E.2d at 850. The Virginia court 
adhered to its original decision, affirming the lower court’s holding that the marriage was void. 
Id. The Supreme Court refused to recall the mandate or set the case for oral argument, instead 
dismissing the case on the ground that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s response “leaves the case 
devoid of a properly presented federal question.” Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956). 
 92. Gunther, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
 93. Wechsler, supra note 89, at 34. 
 94. In another example, DeFunis v. Odegaard, the majority opinion dismissed a contentious 
question of affirmative action on mootness grounds in a short per curiam decision, with blistering 
dissents from Justices Douglas and Brennan accusing the court of seeking to “avoid” 
constitutional issues. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 350 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]e should not transform principles of avoidance of constitutional decisions into devices for 
sidestepping resolution of difficult cases.”). 
 95. CALABRESI, supra note 56, at 16–17. 
 96. For example, in equal protection doctrine, is the neutral principle driving strict scrutiny 
one of anti-subordination or anti-classification?  
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There is little sense that the Court knows and agrees on a principled 
result and is simply avoiding its application. 
And second, straightforward jurisdictional dodges of the type in 
Naim are rare. In fact, modern justiciability doctrines, such as standing, 
ripeness, and mootness, complicate the assessment of strategy: there is 
often some debate about whether a justiciability doctrine is being used 
to avoid contentious issues or whether it reflects substantive and 
principled content on its own terms. Even Bickel acknowledged that 
these doctrinal means of avoiding adjudication on the merits have 
“significance of their own” and some “intellectual content,” and thus 
“none is . . . always available at will.”97 This merging of principle and 
prudence has partly obscured the use of the passive virtues in the years 
since Bickel wrote. 
Standing, perhaps, provides the most powerful example. Though 
some historians argue that it was first constructed as a prudential 
mechanism,98 standing also resonates with the case-and-controversy 
requirement of Article III and has been constitutionalized over time.99 
Furthermore, the development of standing doctrine has produced a 
large and intricate jurisprudence,100 one that has grown sufficiently 
complex to allow for principled debates on its own terms, masking 
possible prudential considerations.101 
 
 97. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 169–70. Gunther referred to Bickel as accepting only a “minimal 
intellectual content that must be respected.” Gunther, supra note 2, at 21. 
 98. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical 
Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 891 (2008). 
 99. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007) (explaining the constitutional 
limitations the case-and-controversy requirement places on federal court jurisdiction and the 
interplay with the standing requirement); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) 
(“Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial 
self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III.”). See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. 
SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 82–83, 85–121 (7th ed. 2011). 
 100. A testament to the development of standing jurisprudence can be seen in the substantial 
attention and space it receives in law school casebooks. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, 
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 111–122, 1139–1160 (7th ed. 2013); MARTIN H. 
REDISH, SUZANNA SHERRY & JAMES E. PFANDER, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND 
QUESTIONS 18–66 (7th ed. 2011). 
 101. If complexity may serve to enhance legitimacy, there is nevertheless bound to be a point 
when complexity begins to undermine legitimacy. See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK 
HOUSE (1853).  
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Hollingsworth v. Perry102 demonstrates this shift. The case 
presented the controversial issue of the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage—a divisive topic roiling national politics and tailor-made for 
a prudential dodge. And not only was the possibility of using standing 
to avoid the merits issue available to the Court, but standing was in fact 
the ground on which the Court dismissed the case.103 Nevertheless, and 
as commentators noted,104 the Court’s opinion addressing the 
complexity of the standing issue obscured any strategic motivation. 
At the outset of the litigation, advocates for same-sex marriage 
worried that it was premature to bring the issue before the Supreme 
Court, given the national divide on the subject.105 The initial suit, Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger,106 was filed in federal district court in 2009 in the 
face of considerable dissatisfaction from various interest groups.107 
Plaintiffs—same-sex couples who were denied marriage licenses—
challenged the constitutionality of Proposition 8, which had amended 
the California Constitution to ensure only opposite-sex marriages were 
valid.108 
When state officials declined to defend the law, the district court 
allowed the official sponsors of Proposition 8 to intervene in their 
stead.109 Finding for the plaintiffs, the district court enjoined state and 
 
 102. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 103. Id. at 2668. 
 104. See, e.g., Klarman, Windsor and Brown, supra note 16, at 145; infra note 121. 
 105. See Deborah L. Rhode, Why Lawyers Become Bad Leaders, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Why-Lawyers-Become-Bad-Leaders/141555 [https:// 
perma.cc/S4PJ-5HCP] (“Boies and Olson pursued a high-risk strategy against the advice of 
groups that had the greatest expertise and stake in the outcome.”).  
 106. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 107. See Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/us/28marriage.html [https://perma.cc/KN9R-
NJMN] (citing Matt Coles, the ACLU’s LGBT project director, as saying, “It’s not something 
that didn’t occur to us . . . . Federal court? Wow. Never thought of that,” and noting that Lambda 
Legal’s marriage project director called the lawsuit “risky and premature”); Press Release, 
ACLU, Why the Ballot Box and Not the Courts Should Be the Next Step on Marriage in California 
(May 27, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/lgbt/ballot_box_20090527.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
AR4T-769F] (noting “there is a lot to lose”); see also Press Release, ACLU, Make Change, Not 
Lawsuits (June 10, 2008), https://www.aclu.org/make-change-not-lawsuits-joint-advisory? 
redirect=cpredirect/35584 [https://perma.cc/RE44-77EX] (“[I]t took 17 years to undo Bowers v. 
Hardwick . . . [a]nd that was fast for the Supreme Court.”).  
 108. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927–28. The marriages of approximately 18,000 couples who 
married prior to Proposition 8 remained valid.  
 109.  Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1068.  
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local officers from enforcing the law, and the intervenors appealed.110 
After introducing the question of standing and certifying a question of 
state law to the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
the intervenors’ ability to stand in place of the state officials to defend 
the initiative’s constitutionality was sufficient to confer Article III 
standing and allow them to prosecute an appeal.111 The Ninth Circuit 
then affirmed the district court’s ruling striking down Proposition 8, 
thus setting the stage for Supreme Court review. 
As the parties were briefing the case at the Supreme Court, 
scholars noted the tensions it presented. At a symposium in October 
2012, William Eskridge said “[u]ntil there is greater consensus, the 
Court ought to avoid any broad pronouncements on the merits of 
plaintiffs’ claim that denying marriage equality to lesbian and gay 
couples violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”112 He suggested that the 
Court use the passive virtues and “dismiss the appeal as nonjusticiable: 
if the supporters of Proposition 8 have no constitutional standing to 
pursue the appeal to the Ninth Circuit or beyond, the Supreme Court 
could avoid any statement on the merits, which would be prudent.”113 
By the time the case was argued, “escap[ing] from the exercise of 
jurisdiction” seemed, to some, increasingly attractive.114 During oral 
argument, Justice Kennedy expressed his view that the “issue was in 
flux.” Describing the oral argument, Orin Kerr suggested Kennedy 
may have been “arguing that the Court shouldn’t get involved in the 
sense that Alex Bickel called the passive virtues—declining to rule on 
the issue while societal views are not yet resolved.”115 Orin Kerr also 
sensed that the Justices were weighing whether to use “the passive 
virtues . . . [to wait for] ‘the political institutions [to] make their 
decision before the Court is required to pass judgment on its 
validity.’”116 And during the months between oral argument and the 
 
 110. Id. at 1069. 
 111. Id. at 1074. 
 112. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Marriage Equality: An Idea Whose Time Is Coming . . ., 37 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 245 (2013). 
 113. Id. at 247.  
 114. Bickel, supra note 1, at 48. 
 115. Orin Kerr, The Timing of the Same-Sex Marriage Case and Bickel’s Passive Virtues, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 27, 2013, 12:56 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/27/the-timing-of-
the-same-sex-marriage-case-and-bickels-passive-virtues [https://perma.cc/53RD-KNLJ]. 
 116. Id. (quoting Bickel, supra note 1, at 60). 
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decision, the blogosphere was alight with references to the passive 
virtues.117 
The circumstances surrounding the case presented a strong 
argument for avoiding adjudication: holding Proposition 8 
constitutional would have served to legitimate a questionable law in 
the context of ongoing social change, with the possibility of stymying 
or retarding political debate on the issue. But finding Proposition 8 
unconstitutional and thereby creating a nationalized right to same-sex 
marriage—whether on due process or equal protection grounds—
could have thrust the Court into a polarized debate, possibly 
engendering backlash and weakening the Court.118 
The Supreme Court ultimately decided that the proponents of 
Proposition 8 had no direct stake in the case’s outcome and thus lacked 
Article III standing.119 But the Court’s doctrinal debate left only a 
narrow opening for claims of strategic manipulation. The majority and 
dissent agreed that standing could not be based on the initiative 
proponents’ individual interests in the legislation. But they diverged on 
whether standing could be based on a representative interest—whether 
the proponents could act as representatives of the state to defend a 
state referendum. The majority concluded that they could not. 
The issue was novel—and given that “the Court had never before 
ruled on this specific standing question, one cannot casually disparage 
the decision in the same way that commentators assailed the Court’s 
dodge of the miscegenation issue in the 1950s.”120 Indeed, scholarly 
commentary in this instance has been mixed.121 And, more importantly, 
 
 117. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, A Federal Judge Strikes Down California’s Proposition 8: Will 
the Ruling Ultimately Advance or Retard Civil Rights for LGBT Americans?, FINDLAW (Aug. 9, 
2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100809.html [https://perma.cc/KP34-63QU]; Michael 
C. Dorf, “All Deliberate Speed” for Same-Sex Marriage?, DORF ON LAW (June 16, 2013), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/06/all-deliberate-speed-for-same-sex.html [https://perma.cc/ 
5LDS-8VPP]; Michael C. Dorf, Passive Virtues Versus Underenforcement in DOMA and Prop 8 
Cases, DORF ON LAW (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/03/passive-virtues-versus-
underenforcement.html [https://perma.cc/NX5W-FFYU]; Meredith Harbach, Perry & the Passive 
Virtues: A Postscript, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 30, 2010, 7:40 PM), http:// 
concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/09/perry-the-passive-virtues-a-postscript.html [https://
perma.cc/4FGB]; Kerr, supra note 115.  
 118. Of course, whether backlash would have resulted, or whether it would have been a 
serious threat to the Court, are key questions which go to the issue of how courts should expend 
the legitimacy they accrue.  
 119. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). 
 120. Klarman, Windsor and Brown, supra note 16, at 145. 
 121. Compare David B. Cruz, “Amorphous Federalism” and the Supreme Court’s Marriage 
Cases, 47 LOY. L. REV. 393, 411–17 (2010) (defending the majority opinion in Perry), and Suzanne 
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the Justices themselves seemed to struggle with the question of agency, 
and both the majority and dissent raised a litany of cases to support 
their positions. Furthermore, the voting breakdown did not present an 
obviously ideological story: Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kagan, Breyer, 
and Ginsburg formed the majority denying standing, with Justices 
Kennedy, Sotomayor, Alito, and Thomas in dissent.122 In other words, 
each side’s opinion appeared principled, though individual Justices 
may have acted strategically in reaching their individual voting 
decisions. 
The dissent suggested that the majority was acting to avoid 
“entering a realm of controversy where the legal community and 
society at large are still formulating ideas and approaches to a most 
difficult subject.”123 But beyond the dissent’s, there were few other 
cries of strategic decisionmaking. There could, of course, be reasons 
for this paucity of complaints other than the complexity of the standing 
doctrine. The Court’s decision created a geographically confined 
middle ground that may have pleased many. It neither recognized a 
national right to same-sex marriage nor denied that such a right could 
exist. And it left undisturbed the right in California, based on the 
district court’s judgment that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.124 But 
even those who approved of the ultimate outcome had no reason to 
deny or ignore the dodge that enabled it—unless they, too, viewed the 
standing decision as a close question of law. It seems plausible, 
therefore, to accept the Court’s decision in Perry as a sincere holding 
on the standing issue. 
 
B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s Sponsors, BLAG, and the Government’s 
Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 166 (2013), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-
U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-164.pdf [https://perma.cc/53QH-AK7W] (arguing against standing for the 
proponents), and Andrew Kim, Note, “Standing” in the Way of Equality? The Myth of Proponent 
Standing and the Jurisdictional Error in Perry v. Brown, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2012) 
(same), with Ryan W. Scott, Standing to Appeal and Executive Non-Defense of Federal Law After 
the Marriage Cases, 89 IND. L.J. 67, 68 (2014) (suggesting deviations from precedent by the 
majority in Perry). Some scholarly analysis is wholly unconcerned with the underlying substantive 
issue of same-sex marriage and more focused on the federalism implications of the standing 
holding and its future effect on state initiatives. See Cruz, supra, at 411–17 (discussing federalism 
implications). See generally Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, Standing at a Constitutional 
Divide: Redefining State and Federal Requirements for Initiatives After Hollingsworth v. Perry, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 (2014) (discussing initiatives). 
 122. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2658. 
 123. Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 124. And the Court’s simultaneous decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), 
provided an avenue to allow the national right to unfold over time.  
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There is a benefit to the Court in the thickening of these 
justiciability doctrines: the increased opacity of the use of the passive 
virtues. In their initial responses to Bickel, critics of his pragmatic 
approach questioned the Court’s ability to successfully hide its 
intentions. Gunther concluded that the average citizen would see little 
difference between the use of the passive virtues to avoid an issue 
(while leaving the challenged statute in place) and an adjudication on 
the merits finding the statute constitutional.125 And, more critically, 
“for the informed court watcher or legal academic, the use of the 
‘passive virtues’ may detract from the Court’s perceived legitimacy,” 
as he or she would recognize the dissembling.126 In other words, much 
of the public would not appreciate the subtle distinction, and those who 
did would understand the passive virtues to be strategic behavior, 
“undermin[ing] the legitimacy of judicial institutions by sending a 
message to the public that courts are not impartial institutions.”127 But, 
and as Perry suggests, as justiciability doctrines become more complex, 
average citizens and informed court watchers alike may find the 
Court’s decisions more principled (or more impenetrable).128 
Standing’s evolution does raise other questions. Standing has 
always presented the tension between safeguarding judicial power by 
limiting it to private rights and abdicating judicial responsibility for 
protecting public rights in a countermajoritarian context.129 And the 
doctrine is being more rigidly constitutionalized, with injury-in-fact, 
causation, and redressability as Article III requirements,130 placing 
 
 125. Gunther, supra note 2, at 8.  
 126. Hellman, supra note 27, at 1144 n.165. 
 127. Radmilovic, supra note 26, at 43 (emphasis omitted) (citing JEFFREY K. STATON, 
JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO (2010)). 
 128. The average citizen may be more sophisticated than the average citizen sixty years ago, 
see Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1121 (1997) (“[R]ecent work suggests that even decisions 
concerning lower salience issues attract public attention for at least a limited period of time.”), as 
media attention to the Court has grown more nuanced and detailed in the past few decades. Note, 
for example, the explanation of the Hollingsworth v. Perry case provided by law professor Eric 
Segall in the L.A. Times. Eric Segall, Opinion, The Prop. 8 Ruling, in Lay Person’s Terms, L.A. 
TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/27/opinion/la-oe-segall-prop8-
explainer-20130627 [https://perma.cc/UP25-Y6D4]. 
 129. See generally Martin H. Redish, The Passive Virtues, The Counter-Majoritarian Principle, 
and the “Judicial-Political” Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 22 CONN. L. REV. 647, 676 
(1990) (identifying this tension and arguing that courts should adhere to “the ‘private rights’ 
model of constitutional adjudication and the justiciability doctrines which flow from it” only “to 
the extent they do not significantly undermine performance of the judiciary’s political role of 
serving as an effective counter-majoritarian constitutional check on the majoritarian branches”).  
 130. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
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prudential considerations in jeopardy.131 The complexity of the 
doctrine may obscure the Court’s intentions, but its 
constitutionalization threatens the flexibility that served as the core 
benefit of this passive virtue.132  
*   *   * 
Flexible agenda-setting tools and prudential considerations allow 
the Court to avoid adjudicating divisive or contentious issues—perhaps 
because the issues would be better solved by the political process. 
Bickel certainly hoped that the Court would not “resolve issues on 
which the political processes are in deadlock” but would “do what it 
can to break that deadlock, so that the political institutions may make 
their decision before the Court is required to pass judgment on its 
validity.”133 
It is not clear that the passive virtues allow for this level of 
dialogue. There are costs to meaningful engagement in silence and 
dissembling. But there may be institutional benefits as well. After all, 
the Supreme Court has developed into the world’s most powerful 
court, rarely limited by doctrine from adjudicating tough issues should 
it choose to do so. As Bush v. Gore134 makes clear, the Supreme Court’s 
effective authority, developed over many decades and often against a 
background of strategic opacity, is robust. 
III.  IN MEDIO: DOCTRINAL INNOVATION IN EUROPE 
As with the ex ante avoidance techniques addressed above, 
avoidance in medio is also designed to prevent a particular merits issue 
from being addressed without foreclosing that issue from arising in the 
 
 131. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–90 
(2014) (reframing the “zone of interests” prudential standing inquiry as a merits inquiry, and 
casting doubt on the framing of the other types of prudential standing: prohibitions on third-party 
standing and generalized grievances); see also Stearns, supra note 98, at 887 (“[T]he earlier 
doctrine developed in the New Deal Court comprised largely prudential constraints on judicial 
powers that Congress had the authority to strengthen or relax as it saw fit.”); Fred O. Smith, Jr., 
Undemocratic Restraint 64 (June 29, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802781&download=yes [https://perma.cc/G5M4-23TH] (“By 
converting doctrines of self-restraint into constitutional barriers . . . this area of law is on an 
imprudent path.”). 
 132. Note that standing also acts as a limitation on lower courts, potentially stifling analysis 
and debate that could be useful to dialogic conversation on the underlying merits question.  
 133. Bickel, supra note 1, at 60. 
 134. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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future. In medio avoidance similarly serves to delay a decision on a 
contentious issue ostensibly to allow for societal norm evolution or for 
political dialogue and legislative resolution of the question. But, in 
contrast to the ex ante approaches, in medio avoidance occurs during 
the case itself, after the merits issues have been aired. The opportunity 
exists, therefore, for a court to opine or comment on the merits issue, 
weighing in on an existing debate without deciding the legal question. 
This Part examines the in medio doctrinal approach created by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): the margin of 
appreciation. It first explains the rights-protection system in which the 
ECtHR operates, noting that other mechanisms of avoidance—ex ante 
agenda setting and ex post remedial options—are unavailable to that 
court. It then turns to the margin of appreciation doctrine, outlining its 
use and function as an avoidance tool. The margin of appreciation 
raises questions about candor, the effectiveness of a dialogic solution, 
and the effective power of the ECtHR itself. 
A. The European Convention System 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, leaders from ten 
European countries created a new regional organization called the 
Council of Europe,135 with a primary goal of composing a human rights 
charter. The result was the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention),136 which entered into force 
in 1953.137 Article 1 of the Convention requires that each member state 
secure to everyone within its jurisdiction a set of defined rights and 
freedoms.138 These rights are mainly civil and political rights: rights 
 
 135. The original ten countries were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 136. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].  
 137. The international law origins of the Convention system present a number of complicating 
factors, such as the existence of reservations to the treaty, see YUTAKA ARAI, EDWIN 
BLEICHRODT, CEES FLINTERMAN, AALT WILLEM HERINGA, JEROEN SCHOKKENBROEK, 
PIETER VAN DIJK, FRIED VAN HOOF, ARJEN VAN RIJN, BEN VERMEULEN, MARC VIERING & 
LEO ZWAAK, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
1101–15 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006), the monist/dualist nature of the application of 
the treaty within the member states, see id. at 26–28, and the right of complaint of states against 
other states for violating the Convention, see id. at 47–51.  
 138. Convention, supra note 136, art. 1. The Convention has been interpreted to require 
“state action.” State action can include state inaction, as “in addition to the primarily negative 
undertaking of a State to abstain from interference in Convention guarantees, ‘there may be 
positive obligations inherent’ in such guarantees.” Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweitz v. 
Switzerland (No. 2), 2009-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 57, 93 para. 79 (quoting Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. 
DELANEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2016  12:38 PM 
30 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1 
considered “essential elements of the foundation of European 
democracies.”139 
The Convention creates a nuanced rights architecture,140 which 
incorporates various possibilities for derogation and limitation by 
member states.141 In the key “Personal Freedoms” articles,142 the first 
paragraph of each provision guarantees a broad substantive right—for 
example, the right to privacy—often formulated in what have been 
described as “vague and general notions,” meant to apply in varied 
situations.143 The second paragraph, however, provides a limitation 
clause. In general, these clauses state that interference with the 
exercise of the relevant right will only be permitted if it is in accordance 
with law and necessary in a democratic society in furtherance of a 
legitimate interest. The difficult definitional work, and ultimately the 
scope of the protected right, is determined through the “extra-juridical 
rules or values” contained in the limitation clauses.144 
Alec Stone Sweet describes the Convention system as one of 
“constitutional justice,” not only due to its entrenchment of 
 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 para. 31 (1979)). Only when the member state “can be held responsible for 
the violation” can an individual challenge an action by another individual as a violation of 
Convention rights. ARAI ET AL., supra note 137, at 29. The applicability of the Convention to 
interactions between private parties, or Drittwirkung, is much debated, though in 2001 the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concluded that it did not “consider it desirable, let 
alone necessary, to elaborate a general theory concerning the extent to which the Convention 
guarantees should be extended to relations between private individuals inter se.” Verein gegen 
Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 243, 259 para. 46.  
 139. ARAI ET AL., supra note 137, at 5. Social rights have been incorporated through 
subsequent protocols, though for a variety of reasons they are rarely considered justiciable.  
 140. Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in EUROPEAN AND US 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 51, 51 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005). 
 141. Article 15 provides a general right of derogation “to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation” “[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation.” Convention, supra note 136, art. 15. But derogation is not permitted under Articles 2 
(right to life), 3 (freedom from torture), 4 (freedom from slavery), and 7 (no ex post facto criminal 
liability). See id. arts. 2, 3, 4, 7. 
 142. These articles are Articles 6 and 8 through 11 of the Convention, supra note 136 
(protecting the right to a public trial, privacy, religion, expression, and association), Articles 1 and 
3 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (protecting property and free elections), and Article 
2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, E.T.S. No. 46 (protecting free movement).  
 143. Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 240, 295 (1996).  
 144. Id. (discussing rights as “undeterminate expressions” (citing R. Sapienza, Sul Margine 
d’Apprezzamento Statale nel Sistema Della Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, 74 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 571, 571–614 (1991))).  
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fundamental rights, but also for its provision of individual access to the 
ECtHR for protection of those rights.145 In fact, the Convention “broke 
new ground as the first treaty granting individuals a right of 
petition”146—an innovation in international agreements that suggests 
the Convention’s quasi-constitutional status.147 The ECtHR itself has 
treated the Convention as having a constitutional aspect,148 and the 
 
 145. Alec Stone Sweet, On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European Court 
of Human Rights as a Constitutional Court 2 (Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper No. 71, 
2009), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=fss_papers 
[https://perma.cc/AZW8-DMSQ]. As initially conceived, the Convention system was ensured and 
maintained by the European Commission of Human Rights as well as by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The Commission decided on the admissibility of an individual 
complaint and reviewed the merits in the first instance. In most cases, the ECtHR would have the 
final merits determination. The Commission, as early as 1961, explained that “the obligations 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention are essentially of an objective 
character, being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings 
from infringement by any of the High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal 
rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves.” Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, 4 Y.B. Eur. 
Conv. on H.R. 116, 140 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.). In 1998, under Protocol 11, the Commission and 
original structure of the ECtHR were replaced by the current court, composed of Committees, 
Chambers, and the Grand Chamber. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol 
11]. 
 146. JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: PROPORTIONALITY, SUBSIDIARITY AND 
PRIMARITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2009). The process now is 
structured by Protocol 11, which states:  
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. 
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise 
of this right. 
Protocol 11, supra note 145, art. 34. Note that in 1998, Protocol 11 eliminated the “opt-out” of 
compulsory jurisdiction of the court, “remov[ing] any formal obstacle to access to the Court for 
individuals, beyond the requirement that petitioners exhaust available domestic remedies.” Helen 
Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, in A 
EUROPE OF RIGHTS 677, 689 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008). 
 147. See ARAI ET AL., supra note 137, at 51 (“It has removed the principal limitation by which 
the position of the individual in international law was traditionally characterised.”). On the 
Convention’s quasi-constitutional status, see Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Effectiveness of the 
System Set Up by the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 2 (1980) (a 
former judge of the ECtHR recognizing the dual nature of the Convention, in discussing “whether 
we are to regard the Convention primarily as a treaty or as a form of ‘constitution’”). See also 
Rudolf Bernhardt, Human Rights and Judicial Review: The European Court of Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 297, 302 (David M. Beatty ed., 1994) (“Both the treaty 
character and the ‘constitutional’ aspect of the Convention should be seen together, but in the 
course of time the constitutional aspect has become predominant.”). Bernhardt was a judge at the 
ECtHR when he wrote this article, and subsequently became the president of the court. 
 148. As early as 1978, the ECtHR explained that “[u]nlike international treaties of the classic 
kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between Contracting 
States. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective 
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court performs “many of the same functions that powerful national 
constitutional courts do, using similar techniques, with broadly similar 
effects.”149 
As a de facto constitutional court in charge of a quasi-
constitutional system of rights protection,150 the ECtHR faces 
considerable institutional challenges.151 There are now forty-seven 
countries that are signatories to the Convention, and with mandatory 
jurisdiction,152 the ECtHR has a tremendous caseload. It had 64,850 
pending cases as of December 31, 2015.153 Rules of admissibility have 
tightened over time, but so long as an applicant has exhausted her 
domestic remedies, access to the court remains broad.154 In 
adjudicating disputes, the court has an extremely difficult task: it must 
“render retrospective justice in individual cases, . . . construct 
 
obligations which, in the words of the Preamble benefit from a ‘collective enforcement.’” Ireland 
v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 90 (1978); see Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995) (describing the Convention as a “constitutional instrument of European 
public order”). Steven Greer describes the Convention as a constitutional order in the sphere of 
human rights, and suggests that the Convention addresses:  
[T]hree quintessentially constitutional questions: the ‘normative question’ of what a 
given Convention right means including its relationship with other rights and with 
collective interests, the ‘institutional question’ of which institutions (judicial/non-
judicial: national/European) should be responsible for providing the answer, and the 
‘adjudicative question’ of how, i.e. by which judicial method, the normative question 
should be addressed. 
Steven Greer, Constitutionalizing Adjudication Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 407 (2003).  
 149. Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights 
Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 53, 77 (2012). 
 150. See Lupu & Voeten, supra note 24, at 415.  
 151. See Kai P. Purnhagen & Emanuele Rebasti, Judge’s Empire? Interview with Rudolf 
Bernhardt, EUR. J. LEG. STUD., Autumn/Winter 2007, at 13, 16 (“[T]he general danger that 
international courts are still dependant [sic] on the co-operation of national governments and if 
an international court is pronouncing judgments which seem to be unacceptable to governments, 
it might well be that they are no longer willing to accept or to follow their respective judgments.”). 
And note that the travaux préparatoires indicate considerable debate about whether to create a 
court at all. Danny Nicol, Original Intent and the European Convention on Human Rights, 2005 
PUB. L. 152, 164–67 (2005). 
 152. Protocol 14, which entered into force in June 2010, has relaxed the strictures somewhat. 
See CONVENTION Protocol 14. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S No. 194. 
 153. EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 188 (2016), https://www. 
echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FST5RBM]. For a 
discussion of the ECtHR’s processes, see generally Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons 
Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 564–70 (2015). 
 154. See EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PRACTICAL GUIDE ON ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA 
22–29 (2014), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/5HFQ-DMG4]. 
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Convention rights and . . . ensure their general effectiveness across 
Europe, prospectively,” with “command and control capacities” that 
are “weak, at best.”155 The ECtHR lacks authority to “invalidate 
national legal norms judged to be incompatible with the Convention” 
directly,156 and the Convention system lacks a powerful supranational 
legislature to aid the court in its efforts.157 
The ECtHR’s toolkit is therefore limited to its moral authority158 
and its ability to order compensatory damages and other remedies.159 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe also encourages, 
and occasionally obliges, member states to engage with the court’s 
decisions.160 At bottom, the ECtHR is reliant on the “good will and 
 
 155. Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders, 
in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS 3, 14 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008). 
 156. Id. at 13.  
 157. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has no power to pass 
binding laws but can engage in dialogue with the governments of the member states and issue 
recommendations. See Føllesdal, supra note 21, at 344 (“[T]here are no identifiable legislative or 
executive bodies that serve to check and balance the international judiciary—though there are 
‘multi-level’ checks and balances of contested significance.”). 
 158. Cf. Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: 
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 391, 465 (2001) (noting that the member states “have accepted the [ECtHR] and its 
judgments as legitimate, binding and enforceable”).  
 159. Yuval Shany argues that “[o]nce the European Court started indicating more intrusive 
remedies, however—including individual, nonmonetary remedies (such as orders to reopen faulty 
legal proceedings) and general measures (such as requiring states to adopt broad legal or policy 
reforms), compliance rates significantly declined.” Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of 
International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 263 (2012) (citation 
omitted). In addition, the “Council of Europe reports on execution suggest . . . that the high rates 
of compliance with compensation orders did not necessarily translate into good levels of primary 
norm compliance.” Id. at 264. A new remedial approach has been codified in Rule 61 of the court, 
EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF THE COURT, R. 61 (2016), http://www.echr. 
coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FRF-VZJP]. The “pilot judgment 
procedure” seeks to reduce the caseload of the ECtHR by identifying similar cases resulting from 
the same national problem, grouping them together, and then providing a pilot judgment which 
can be used to resolve the national problem rather than a case-by-case adjudication. See id. This 
aggregation mechanism allows the ECtHR “to identify the dysfunction under national law that is 
at the root of [a] violation; and to give clear indications to the Government as to how it can 
eliminate this dysfunction.” See EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PILOT JUDGMENT 
PROCEDURE 1, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_judgment_procedure_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/557Y-UPCZ]. 
 160. See, e.g., Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Verification of the 
Compatibility of Draft Laws, Existing Laws, and Administrative Practice with the Standards Laid 
Down in the European Convention on Human Rights, Recommendation CM/Rec (2004) 5 
(adopted May 12, 2004), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001
6805dd194 [https://perma.cc/PDZ7-W9BZ]; Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 
Publication and Dissemination in the Member States of the Text of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and of the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, Recommendation 
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good faith of most States” to ensure that its rulings are carried into 
effect.161 Notwithstanding this weak enforcement regime, compliance 
is nevertheless accepted as of critical importance for the institution’s 
legitimacy and effectiveness.162  
B. The Margin of Appreciation 
As the description of the Convention’s rights architecture 
indicates, the ECtHR is tasked with maneuvering between the 
aspirations of the Convention and the actualities of its member 
states.163 It must “thread the needle between a decision that would be 
unprincipled . . . and one that would be sharply divisive” or, in the 
context of the Convention system, one that could be ignored.164 The 
ECtHR has had to rely on its creativity in its “attempt to strike a 
balance between national views of human rights and the uniform 
 
CM/Rec (2008) 13 (adopted Dec. 18, 2002), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon
SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168063ca51 [https://perma.cc/2BYP
-S5FX].  
 161. Stone Sweet & Keller, supra note 155, at 14; see also Bernhardt, supra note 147, at 303 
(“[T]he effective application of the Convention and the smooth working of the supervisory 
machinery presuppose and require a spirit of cooperation and a considerable homogeneity among 
the participating States.”); R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 123 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher & 
H. Petzold eds., 1993) (describing the court as resting “on the fragile foundations of the consent 
of the Contracting Parties”).  
 162. See Courtney Hillebrecht, Rethinking Compliance: The Challenges and Prospects of 
Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights Tribunals, 1 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 362, 
362 (2009). For a further discussion of the challenges of measuring compliance, on which there is 
some dispute, see Sharanbir Grewal & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Implementing European 
Court of Human Rights Judgements 1–2 (Jan. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988258 [https://perma.cc/GLL6-9HKR] (noting differences in 
perceived compliance rates). 
 163. See Waldock, supra note 147, at 9 (describing a need “to reconcile the effective operation 
of the Convention with the sovereign powers and responsibilities of governments in a 
democracy”); cf. Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1968) (“The 
Court cannot disregard those legal and factual features which characterise the life of the society 
in the State which . . . has to answer for the measure in dispute.”).  
 164. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 112, at 246 (describing the challenge faced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the same-sex marriage litigation); see also ELIAS KASTANAS, UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ: 
NOTIONS AUTONOMES ET MARGE D’APPRÉCIATION DES ETATS DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE DE 
LA COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 15 (1996) (“It is a Gordian knot, which the 
traditional methods of interpretation cannot slice.”) (author’s translation).  
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application of Convention values,”165 and it has created a doctrine to 
do so: the “margin of appreciation.”166 
The term “margin of appreciation” is found neither in the text of 
the Convention nor in the travaux préparatoires.167 Instead, its origins 
lie in the French marge d’appréciation, an administrative law concept 
of discretion that is shared by many civil law jurisdictions.168 The 
doctrine gives the member states “the freedom to act; [providing] 
maneuvering, breathing or ‘elbow’ room.”169 This space allows for 
permissible variation in the application of the Convention. 
Initially, the ECtHR turned to the margin concept in the face of 
emergency derogations from Convention rights by member states, 
permitted under Article 15.170 A concept first deployed to navigate 
public emergencies—situations in which courts often are at their 
 
 165. See YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 3 (2002). 
 166. See id.; see also Donoho, supra note 158, at 455 (describing the margin as designed “to 
accommodate variations among state parties in their implementation of rights, while at the same 
time preserving the core ‘European’ values they reflect”). Although the Commission’s analysis 
has been influential in the development of the margin of appreciation doctrine, I intend to focus 
on the case law and development of doctrine by the ECtHR. The Commission’s case law has in 
large part “been incorporated or replaced by case law of the Court.” ARAI ET AL., supra note 137, 
at v; see Thomas A. O’Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474, 475–76 (1982) 
(“[W]hile the Commission publishes an opinion as to the law of the Convention, it is the Court 
that is empowered to interpret and apply the Convention. The Court is not in any way bound by 
the opinion of the Commission; and its interpretation of the Convention has differed often from 
that of the Commission.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Universality 
Versus Subsidiarity: A Reply, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.REV. 73, 79–81 (1998) (providing an example 
of when the court and the Commission differed in their evaluations of a restriction on free 
speech). 
 167. See HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE 
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1996). 
 168. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 165, at 2. In Germany the concept is termed 
Ermessensspielraum. Id. at 3. The French term may also be translated as “margin of 
assessment/appraisal/estimation.” STEVEN GREER, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION: 
INTERPRETATION AND DISCRETION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
5 (2000). 
 169. YOUROW, supra note 167, at 13. 
 170. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 71 (1978) (detailing alleged 
violations of the Convention by the U.K. in Northern Ireland); Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1961) (allegation that a U.K. detention due to suspected involvement with 
the IRA violated the Convention); Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, 19581959 Y.B. 
Eur. Conv. on H.R 174, 174–79 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (detailing alleged violations of the 
Convention by the U.K. in Cyprus). 
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weakest171—the margin of appreciation soon expanded beyond the 
Article 15 context. 
The ECtHR relied on the doctrine in one of its earliest Personal 
Freedoms cases, Handyside v. United Kingdom,172 in 1976. Richard 
Handyside, a U.K. publisher, was convicted under the Obscene 
Publications Acts of 1959 and 1964 for the publication of The Little Red 
Schoolbook, which was deemed likely to deprave and corrupt its 
readers.173 Before the ECtHR, Handyside alleged a violation of Article 
10 of the Convention, protecting his freedom of expression.174 In 
response, the United Kingdom contended that its actions fell properly 
within the limitations articulated in Article 10(2)—subjecting 
Handyside’s right to “such . . . restrictions . . . necessary in a democratic 
society . . . for the protection of health or morals.”175 
 
 171. Cf., e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality 
of the detention of U.S. citizens in internment camps during the Second World War). In these 
emergency contexts, the margin appeared as a “strategy aimed at self-preservation,” Brems, supra 
note 143, at 297, and was a doctrinal recognition of the ECtHR’s weak position as a quasi-
international and quasi-constitutional institution. Judge Martens has stated: 
[I]n my opinion States do not enjoy a margin of appreciation as a matter of right, but 
as a matter of judicial self-restraint. Saying that the Court will leave a certain margin 
of appreciation to the States is another way of saying that the Court [is] conscious that 
its position as an international tribunal having to develop the law in a sensitive area 
calls for caution . . . . 
Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1990) (Martens, J., dissenting) (end 
note omitted); cf. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 314 (1997) (“[F]ledgling tribunals . . . may feel 
that their authority and legitimacy depends on not antagonizing those governments on which their 
power ultimately depends, and on proceeding diplomatically.”). 
 172. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).  
 173. Id. at 3–8. The book challenged social norms, including those relating to sex, drug use, 
and authority. See Joanna Moorhead, The Little Red Schoolbook–Honest About Sex and the Need 
to Challenge Authority, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2014, 2:34 AM), http://www.theguardian. 
com/education/2014/jul/08/the-little-red-schoolbook-republished-soren-hansen [https://perma.cc/ 
W6VJ-GJAY]. 
 174. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11, 13. “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” 
Convention, supra note 136, art. 10(1). 
 175. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13–14 (quoting Convention, supra note 136, art. 
10(2)). Article 10(2) states:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.  
Convention, supra note 136, art. 10(2).  
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The ECtHR did not make an independent determination of the 
meaning of Article 10(2) but rather deemed it within the United 
Kingdom’s “margin of appreciation” to define the limits of public 
morality.176 It looked for a common European definition of morals, 
concluding, in words that would continue to resonate in its case law, 
that on this issue: 
[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various 
Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The 
view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals 
varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era 
which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of 
opinions on the subject.177 
Thus the ECtHR highlighted that consensus,178 or the search for 
uniform conceptions within Europe, would aid it in giving content to 
the rights protected by the Convention and the scope of an individual 
nation’s margin of appreciation.179 
Subsequently, in applying the limitation clauses, the ECtHR has 
clarified that “necessary in a democratic society” means that the 
limitation must address a pressing social need and be proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued.180 Proportionality “deals primarily with the 
collision of values between an individual and her society.”181 In other 
words, it identifies the outer limits of enforceable rights based on 
balancing the individual’s interests with those of the state. The margin 
of appreciation doctrine often dovetails with proportionality, as it 
allows national states leeway in determining what may count as a 
 
 176. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15–19. Note the similarity to the community 
standards doctrine in U.S. First Amendment case law. For further discussion, see Mary Anne 
Case, Community Standards and the Margin of Appreciation, 25 HUM. RTS. L.J. 10 (2004). 
 177. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23–24.  
 178. Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1968), a case which addressed 
issues of language and schooling in Belgium, is considered “the earliest use of a consensus 
standard by the Court in its search for a workable basis upon which to perform its supervisory 
function.” YOUROW, supra note 167, at 30. 
 179. Even in its earliest incarnations, the consensus standard was problematic; The Little Red 
Schoolhouse, while considered obscene in England, “circulated freely throughout Europe.” 
Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 138 (2005).  
 180. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 23–24.  
 181. Aaron A. Ostrovsky, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? How the 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Preserves Core Human Rights Within Cultural Diversity and 
Legitimises International Human Rights Tribunals, 1 HANSE L. REV. 47, 47 (2005). 
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pressing social need.182 And the ECtHR often (and confusingly) melds 
both doctrines, “‘in the sense either that, having regard to the margin 
of appreciation, the impugned measure [may be] found to be 
proportionate (no violation) or that, even having regard to the margin 
of appreciation, it [could be] found to be disproportionate 
(violation).’”183 Based on this approach, Stone Sweet has argued, 
“[T]he margin of appreciation has little or no autonomy; instead, the 
scope of deference the Court gives to States is a product itself of 
proportionality analysis.”184 But it is perhaps more accurate to 
acknowledge, as do others, that “[t]he interaction between the 
principle of proportionality, the margin of appreciation, and the 
ordinary canons of interpretation remains a partial mystery.”185 
Given its connection to the proportionality inquiry, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine has been described as a deference concept, 
similar to the tiers of scrutiny in the United States,186 with a principled 
basis in federalism (or subsidiarity) concerns.187 In certain cases, the use 
of the margin may be an expression of the ECtHR’s understanding that 
national authorities “are better placed to decide on politically sensitive 
 
 182. ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 37 (2012).  
 183. CHRISTOFFERSEN, supra note 146, at 1 (citing John Joseph Cremona, The 
Proportionality Principle in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in RECHT 
ZWISCHEN UMBRAUCH UND BEWAHRUNG 323, 328 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995)).  
 184. Stone Sweet, supra note 145, at 5. In fact, Stone Sweet and Keller suggest that “[t]he 
Court adopted proportionality as a means of ensuring that States would take qualified rights 
seriously, notwithstanding the principles of subsidiarity and margin of appreciation.” Keller & 
Stone Sweet, supra note 146, at 699 (emphasis added).  
 185. CHRISTOFFERSEN, supra note 146, at 1. 
 186. See Ostrovsky, supra note 181, at 47 (“[A] functional margin of appreciation is applied 
in the United States in the court-created rational basis test.”). 
 187. See LEGG, supra note 182, at 61. Subsidiarity, like federalism, is a principle of vertical 
power-sharing and multi-level governance, and, like federalism, is difficult to operationalize. See 
George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and 
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 344, 367 (1994). It provides that tasks should be performed 
by the level of government most suited to do so and decisions should be taken as closely as 
possible to the individual citizen, but scholars and politicians contest the relevant criteria by which 
that determination should be made—efficiency, effectiveness, conduciveness to local democracy 
or to character formation, and so forth. See Andreas Føllesdsal, Survey Article: Subsidiarity, 6 J. 
POL. PHIL. 190, 190 (1998) (recognizing widespread support for subsidiarity but as a consensus 
“gained only by obfuscation”). In the Convention system, subsidiarity takes on yet another 
meaning, as it also encompasses the idea that the ECtHR’s protection of rights is subsidiary to 
that of the member states. See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human 
Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 128 (2008). 
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issues” within the individual member state.188 The possibility that the 
margin of appreciation is a corollary to subsidiarity suggests a doctrine 
rooted in a test of comparative institutional competence,189 or perhaps 
in questions of democratic legitimacy.190 
The way in which the margin is utilized, however, undermines any 
claim to a robust principled approach.191 In fact, the role of societal 
consensus—and its pragmatic connection to compliance—seems to 
have as much a place in the ECtHR’s deployment of the margin 
doctrine as subsidiarity-based deference.192 The scope of deference to 
national authorities is often delineated by the existing European 
consensus—or lack thereof—on the content of individual human 
rights.193 Thus, deference can fluctuate from right to right (or, more 
accurately, from limitation to limitation), and even from country to 
country.194 In the first instance, the ECtHR is likely to allow a state 
limitation on a Convention right, but as the understanding of the scope 
and content of the right develops, later applicants may have more 
success.195 Were comparative competence or democratic legitimacy 
 
 188. George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 705, 723 (2006).  
 189. See Letsas, supra note 188, at 721; Stone Sweet & Keller, supra note 155, at 6.  
 190. Andreas von Staden suggests that the margin of appreciation may be a way to provide 
for democratic legitimacy of the ECtHR, by “recogniz[ing] the legitimate exercise of decision-
making authority by national governments in specific contexts as an appropriate instantiation of 
self-government at that level and, as a result, requir[ing] international courts to exercise some 
deference.” Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: 
Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1023, 1023, 1039–
42 (2012).  
 191. See Paul Martens, Perplexity of the National Judge Faced with the Vagaries of European 
Consensus, in EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., DIALOGUE BETWEEN 
JUDGES 53, 54 (2008) (“The concept, then, is sometimes positive, sometimes negative, sometimes 
descriptive, sometimes prescriptive, sometimes decisive, sometimes contingent.”). For a new 
attempt at reconciling the various usages of the margin of appreciation, see generally Oddny Mjöll 
Arnardóttir, Rethinking the Two Margins of Appreciation, 12 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 27 (2016). 
 192. See KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 129–42 (2015).  
 193. Letsas, supra note 188, at 722.  
 194. See YOUROW, supra note 167, at 179 (“The scope of the allowable domestic margin of 
appreciation may expand or contract on a case-by-case basis, depending upon which Article, and 
which limitations upon rights and upon state power to restrict them, are involved.”). 
 195. The evolution of the rights of transsexuals provides a trenchant example. In 1986, Mark 
Rees, who had been born Brenda Rees, sought to change the sex designation on his birth 
certificate. The U.K. Registrar General refused to alter the Register of Births and Deaths, and 
Rees challenged this action before the ECtHR as a violation, inter alia, of Article 8, the right to 
respect for private and family life. The ECtHR found no violation, concluding that “the law 
appears to be in a transitional stage,” and therefore Britain’s decision to maintain the policy of 
entering the facts at time of birth into the birth records was within its margin of appreciation. 
DELANEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2016  12:38 PM 
40 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1 
truly driving the analysis, then it would be strange to see the margin 
afforded to a nation narrowed over time. 
Thus, rather than a doctrine of principled institutional deference, 
the margin of appreciation is often an exercise in prudential restraint.196 
“The conjunction of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the 
consensus inquiry . . . permits the [ECtHR] to link its decisions to the 
pace of change of domestic law, acknowledging the political 
sovereignty of respondent states while legitimizing its own decisions 
against them.”197 It is an expressly majoritarian approach to rights 
articulation.198 In this way, the margin functions to support the 
ECtHR’s institutional capacity and stability, by allowing it to avoid 
adjudicating the underlying rights question and to protect it from 
“taking sides in the resolution of genuine human rights/public interest 
dilemmas which are not amenable to any straightforward legal 
solution.”199 
The margin of appreciation allows the ECtHR to avoid a final 
determination of the content or scope of a particular Convention right 
while nevertheless maintaining its supervisory function and the 
possibility of revisiting the question. A few structural factors aid the 
ECtHR in this endeavor: mandatory jurisdiction requires the ECtHR 
frequently to revisit rights in dispute and thus provides it with the 
 
Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 10 para. 37 (Oct. 17, 1986), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57564 [https://perma.cc/Z48E-YHUJ] (12-3 decision). Over 
the following fifteen years, the ECtHR revisited the issue four times, monitoring the evolution of 
the law while allowing for a margin of appreciation, and by 2002, based on changing social norms, 
it concluded that the United Kingdom could “no longer claim that the matter falls within [its] 
margin of appreciation.” Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 27 para. 93 (July 11, 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60596 [https://perma.cc/
7KXG-CJHH] (unanimous decision).  
 196. Describing the margin as an “exercise” is perhaps the best way to refer to the concept; 
Steven Greer questions whether the margin “is really a ‘doctrine’ at all since it could be said to 
lack the minimum theoretical specificity and coherence which a viable legal doctrine requires.” 
GREER, supra note 168, at 32. 
 197. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 171, at 317. 
 198. See Anatoly Kovler, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Lech Garlicki, Dean Spielmann, Renate 
Jaeger & Roderick Liddell, The Role of Consensus in the System of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, in DIALOGUE BETWEEN JUDGES, supra note 191, at 11, 54. Kovler, et al., note: 
Consensus legitimises progress and facilitates its reception into domestic law. 
Consensus drives forward or, on the contrary, restrains the Court’s interpretation of 
the Convention. . . . [W]here there is a large degree of consensus, the government’s 
margin of appreciation will be severely limited. Conversely, where there is an absence 
of consensus, the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities will be 
correspondingly wide.  
Id. (citations omitted).  
 199. GREER, supra note 168, at 33. 
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opportunity to monitor the evolution of European norms.200 
Furthermore, the ECtHR is not bound by its earlier decisions, though 
precedents should not be departed from “without good reason.”201 In 
addition, the ECtHR, through dicta, can place some pressure on 
member states to alter their own laws and to reach consensus.202 
By explicitly asking the national courts and legislatures to work in 
partnership with it to achieve the Convention’s goals,203 the ECtHR’s 
deliberate and dialogic approach may serve to protect its institutional 
legitimacy. The variation in relative standards encourages litigation, 
“animat[ing] the [ECtHR’s] majoritarian activism and the dynamic of 
interjudicial competition that enables [the legal order] to transcend 
rights minimalism.”204 And as Yuval Shany has written, “[C]ompliance 
with low-cost judgments (that is, those in which the Court has afforded 
member states a considerable margin of appreciation) seems to have 
bolstered the Court’s legitimacy capital; such capital eventually 
enabled the Court to issue higher-cost judgments affording member 
states a narrower margin of appreciation.”205 This view puts a positive 
spin on the usual concern about the effectiveness of international 
courts: the danger of a “low-aiming court, issuing minimalist remedies, 
[which] may generate a high level of compliance but have little impact 
on the state of the world.”206 
 
 200. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Mamatkulov v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30 para. 
105 (Feb. 6, 2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68183 [https://perma.cc/A3BG-5VR7] 
(“While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, in the interests of legal 
certainty and foreseeability it should not depart, without good reason, from its own precedents.”). 
One “good reason” is “any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved.” Goodwin, 
App. No. 28957/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21 para. 74. 
 202. See, e.g., Sheffield v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31-32/1997/815-816/1018-1019, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 17 para. 60 (July 10, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58212 [https://perma.cc/
X37U-MYXW] (“[T]he Court cannot but note that despite its statements in the Rees and Cossey 
cases on the importance of keeping the need for appropriate legal measures in this area under 
review . . . . Even if it finds no breach of Article 8 in this case, the Court reiterates that this area 
needs to be kept under review by Contracting States.”).  
 203. See Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 40 para. 163 (June 9, 2009), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92945 [https://perma.cc/YVW7-TKTX] (asking “whether the 
national authorities have sufficiently taken into account the principles flowing from its judgments 
on similar issues, even when they concern other States”). 
 204. Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights 
Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOB. CONST. 53, 79 (2012). 
 205. Shany, supra note 159, at 269–70.  
 206. Id. at 227. Even further, some argue that minimalist decisions and permissive standards 
may have an “erosive effect.” The Vice-President of the Hungarian Constitutional Court argues 
that the ECtHR’s decision in Rekvényi v. Hungary, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 423, in which the 
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Furthermore, and although the normative rule-of-law pull to 
comply with court decisions remains a relevant constraint for most 
democratic countries,207 scholars have demonstrated that compliance is 
in large part driven by domestic constraints and rational choice.208 In 
this light, the margin of appreciation doctrine usefully “allows for the 
participation of state powers in the elaboration and application of a 
norm,”209 giving the ECtHR a way to place issues on the domestic 
agendas of the member states.210 And “the notion of 
consensus . . . confers a certain legitimacy on new developments and 
facilitates their reception in domestic legal orders.”211  
There are costs, however.212 The margin of appreciation has 
generated considerable criticism.213 The overarching and most 
pervasive complaint stems from the fear that the ECtHR is abdicating 
its judicial responsibility to provide an autonomous interpretation of 
 
ECtHR “showed understanding for the transitional period of consolidation of democracy,” 
actually allowed the Hungarian court to relax its own constitutional standards. Péter Paczolay, 
Consensus and Discretion: Evolution or Erosion of Human Rights Protection?, in DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN JUDGES, supra note 191, at 69, 54 (quoting Judge Luzius Wildhaber, Speech Given on 
the Occasion of the Opening of the Judicial Year, 20 January 2006, in EUR. COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., DIALOGUE BETWEEN JUDGES 69, 73 (2006)). 
 207. Andreas von Staden, Rational Choice Within Normative Constraints: Compliance by 
Liberal Democracies with the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 20 (Feb. 26, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000024 
[https://perma.cc/G755-KRX3].  
 208. See Grewal & Voeten, supra note 162, at 4 (attributing the decisions of political leaders 
of whether to implement a ECtHR ruling to political pressures from both domestic and 
international sources); von Staden, supra note 207, at 26–27 (finding, after an examination of the 
implementation of adverse judgments in the United Kingdom and Germany, empirical support 
that compliance levels were driven by rational choice).  
 209. KASTANAS, supra note 164 (author’s translation). 
 210. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal 
Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77 (2014) (arguing that ECtHR 
judgments can put an issue on the domestic agenda, and using LGBT issues as an example of this 
power). 
 211. Dean Spielmann, Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and 
the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?, 14 
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 381, 404 (2012). 
 212. For further discussion, see infra Part V.  
 213. Greer, supra note 148, at 408 n.14 (“The critical literature on the margin of appreciation 
is now extensive.”); see also GREER, supra note 168, at 29 (“[T]he margin of appreciation is an 
inappropriate notion here since determining the relationship between these and other 
Convention rights should be a matter of autonomous judicial definition and not subject to national 
executive or administrative policy at all.”); Michael R. Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 638, 649 (1999) (denying 
the margin serves as a “coherent jurisprudential principle”); Paul Mahoney, Marvellous Richness 
of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1998) (describing various 
criticisms of the margin approach).  
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Convention rights that imposes a uniform standard across the 
system.214 Scholars argue that the margin has become “a substitute for 
coherent legal analysis of the issues at stake.”215 Given the role of 
consensus in the margin analysis, “[t]he law of the Convention 
sometimes seems neither greater nor less than the consensus or lack 
thereof in the law and practice of the States Parties.”216 And there is 
fragility in rights protection if it is tied to majoritarian preferences.217 
IV.  EX POST: PLAYING WITH REMEDIES 
An American assumption that avoidance strategy is most easily 
deployed ex ante is refuted by the creative remedial constructs 
developed in South Africa and Canada. How any individual court 
chooses to construct its legitimacy will necessarily depend on history 
and opportunity, and as will be shown below, these two courts are more 
limited in their ability to squeeze off litigation at the front end and thus 
are more likely to hear and decide the contentious merits issues. The 
ultimate turn to ex post remedial discretion—occasionally described as 
“remanding to the legislature”—opens up questions of dialogue and of 
the relationship between remedy and the rights definition itself. 
This Part first reviews why ex ante avoidance, particularly through 
justiciability doctrines, is largely unavailable in South Africa and 
Canada and then discusses the alternative ex post remedial approach 
used to foster dialogue. After a judicial finding of unconstitutionality, 
a delay in the declaration of invalidity permits the legislature to remedy 
the violation in the first instance. The nuances of the application of this 
doctrine vary in each system, including the degree of candor with which 
each court describes its rationale for delay (which in turn influences the 
possible quality and quantity of dialogue). 
 
 214. See Greer, supra note 148, at 429 (“Reconciling conflicts between Convention rights is 
quintessentially a judicial task, permitting no genuine margin of appreciation to national non-
judicial institutions at all.”).  
 215. Mahoney, supra note 213, at 1 (citing Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC, The European 
Convention on Human Rights in the New Architecture of Europe: General Report, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUY ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 236−37 (1995)); see also Brauch, supra note 179, at 149 (“The margin of 
appreciation . . . has freed the Court from having to do the real and challenging work of 
interpreting the meaning and contours of the rights that are protected in the Convention.”). 
 216. YOUROW, supra note 167, at 195. 
 217. Even in his vigorous defense of majoritarian parliamentary democracy for rights 
protection, Waldron must assume a highly functional democratic system, based on principles of 
political equality, in which all participants have an avowed commitment to rights. See Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1361 (2006). 
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A. The South African Remedial Power 
1. Irrigating the Arid Ground.  The history of the judiciary in 
apartheid South Africa is marked by disappointment: early courageous 
efforts by the courts to stand up to Parliament were stymied and 
countermeasures (court packing and jurisdiction stripping) were 
employed.218 By the mid-1960s, parliamentary sovereignty was 
dominant,219 and “‘the overall impression [was] of a 
judiciary . . . prepared to adopt an interpretation that w[ould] facilitate 
the executive’s task rather than defend the liberty of the subject and 
uphold the Rule of Law.’”220 As Justice Mahomed wrote in 1993, “the 
impotence of the judiciary to act visibly and effective in [the pursuit of 
justice], potentially imperils not only its own legitimacy, but the 
legitimacy of law itself in the perception of those subject to its 
sanction.”221 
In the sweeping inhumanity of the apartheid era in South Africa, 
justiciability doctrines themselves played a small role, but “it was often 
procedural or technical barriers to litigation which prevented issues of 
substance from coming before the courts just as much in the express 
limitations on legal access.”222 Standing was restricted,223 and 
exceptions were interpreted narrowly.224 By the 1980s, commentators 
complained that “[t]he standing requirement can be manipulated by 
judges who feel disinclined to hear certain cases or to decide certain 
issues for reasons which are not openly expressed.”225 And while 
 
 218. Heinz Klug, Historical Background, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 2−3 
(Chaskalson et al. eds., 1996) (discussing early cases); see also JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 280 (1978) (discussing early “courageous” decisions). 
 219. Klug, supra note 218, at 2−3 (“The passage of the 1961 Republican Constitution secured 
the dominance of parliamentary sovereignty.”). 
 220. DUGARD, supra note 218, at 280 (citing INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, EROSION OF THE 
RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA, at iv (1968)). 
 221. Justice Ismail Mahomed, The Impact of a Bill of Rights on Law and Practice in South 
Africa, DE REBUS 460, 460–61 (June 1993).  
 222. Ctr. for Applied Legal Studies, Summaries of Papers and Discussion, in EMERGENCY 
LAW 12, 15 (Nicholas Haysom & Lauran Mangan eds., 1987). 
 223. Plaintiffs were required to show both “a personal interest in the matter and to have been 
adversely affected by the wrong alleged.” Cheryl Loots, Standing, Ripeness and Mootness, in 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA § 7.2 (2d ed. 2008) (citing Bagnall v. Colonial Gov’t 
(1907) 24 SC 470 (S. Afr.); Patz v. Greene & Co. 1907 TS 427 (S. Afr.)).  
 224. See generally Cheryl Loots, Keeping Locus Standi in Chains, 3 SAJHR 66 (1987) 
[hereinafter Loots, Locus Standi] (commenting on the judiciary’s narrow interpretation of cases 
which displayed a liberalized attitude toward locus standi). 
 225. Edwin Cameron, Legal Standing and the Emergency, in EMERGENCY LAW, supra note 
222, at 61, 64; see Loots, Locus Standi, supra note 224, at 69.  
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relaxing standards slightly, reform initiatives did not remotely 
approximate the dramatic shifts seen in other common-law countries.226 
As one commentator noted, “[O]ur courts have had the opportunity to 
liberalize the standing rule . . . and have failed to do so.”227 
In the transformative constitutional creation process following the 
collapse of the apartheid regime, issues of standing received explicit 
attention. In the Interim Constitution, section 7(4) was designed to 
prevent a restrictive approach to the enforcement of rights.228 And in 
the Final Constitution, section 38 outlines generous standing rules for 
rights claims. Beyond the right to proceed in an action in one’s own 
interest, the section provides public-interest standing and 
representative standing. (In fact, these rules have begun to impact 
areas outside of the Bill of Rights context.229) In addition, section 34 
provides the fundamental right of access to a court.230 In combination, 
therefore, sections 38 and 34 suggest “a deliberate bias toward[] 
enhanced access to court.”231 
The Final Constitution grants the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa (CCSA) jurisdiction over “constitutional matters,” and section 
167(6) requires that, “when it is in the interests of justice and with leave 
of the Constitutional Court,” a person should be able “to bring a matter 
directly to the Constitutional Court[] or . . . to appeal directly to the 
Constitutional Court from any other court.”232 The CCSA assesses 
leave to appeal using a two-step test, asking whether “the application 
raises a constitutional matter,” and whether “it is in the interests of 
 
 226. Clive Plasket, Country Report, Representative Standing in South African Law, in 
GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE 1, 35 (2007), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/documents/south_africa_national_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF2D-NCKD].  
 227. Cheryl Loots, Standing to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 10 SAJHR 49, 51 (1994) 
[hereinafter Loots, Standing]. 
 228. Id. at 49. 
 229. See McCarthy v. Constantia Prop. Owners’ Ass’n 1999 (4) SA 847 (C) at 855 B–E (S. 
Afr.) (“In the context of the present case the Constitution clearly envisages a generous regime of 
access to courts . . . . [T]he Bill of Rights was not only designed to introduce the culture of 
justification in respect of public law but intended to ensure that the exercise of private power 
should similarly be justified. Accordingly the carefully constructed but artificial divide between 
public and private law . . . can no longer be sustained in an uncritical fashion and hence 
unquestioned application.”); Wildlife Soc’y of S. Afr. v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 1996 
(3) SA 1095 (Tk) at 1104–06 (S. Afr.).  
 230. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 34 (“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.”). 
 231. Plasket, supra note 226, at 12. 
 232. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 167(6).  
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justice to grant leave.”233 The CCSA has a capacious definition of 
constitutional matters; in fact, one commentator described the CCSA 
as having left “the jurisdictional door . . . so wide open that the Court 
has had to develop another way of limiting its case load.”234 And in 
evaluating the “interests of justice,” the CCSA has created a multi-
factor balancing test,235 which it is willing to apply loosely.236 These 
relaxed standing rules and expansive exercise of its jurisdiction to hear 
cases are mirrored in the court’s flexible and generous approaches to 
other justiciability doctrines, such as ripeness and mootness.237 
The historical evolution of the role of the judiciary in South 
Africa—and of the CCSA in particular—demonstrates that ex ante 
justiciability doctrines are off the table as strategic means to avoid 
deciding politicized issues that might threaten the court’s institutional 
legitimacy.238 As the CCSA said in 1996, 
[A]ccess to the courts in constitutional matters should not be 
precluded by rules of standing developed in a different constitutional 
environment in which a different model of adjudication 
predominated. In particular, it is important that it is not only those 
with vested interests who should be afforded standing in 
constitutional challenges, where remedies may have a wide impact.239 
The expansion of standing rules acknowledged the challenges people 
had in enforcing their rights,240 as well as the chilling effects of any 
 
 233. Ingledew v. Fin. Servs. Bd. 2003 (4) SA 584 (CC) at 589–90 para. 13 (S. Afr.).  
 234. Sebastian Seedorf, Jurisdiction, in 4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 125 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
 235. The factors relevant to this test are: “the importance of the issue raised,” “the prospects 
of success,” “the public interest in a determination of the constitutional issues raised,” and “the 
accuracy of the pleadings.” Kate Hofmeyr, Rules and Procedure in Constitutional Matters, in 5 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 24–25 (2d ed. 2008). 
 236. Id. at 126 (“[The CCSA] has affirmed that it is in the interests of justice for it to consider 
a case even where the prospects of success are not self-evident, [or] for the benefit of the broader 
public or to achieve legal certainty, even though such a decision would go beyond the immediate 
needs of the parties.”). 
 237. And, as yet, the CCSA has not developed a political question doctrine. Theunis Roux, 
Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 7 INT’L J. ON CONST. L. 
106, 126 n.82 (2008). 
 238. In fact, in fulfillment of its charge to develop the goals of the Final Constitution, the 
CCSA could be said to have a responsibility to provide generous access. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, 
§ 39. 
 239. Ferreira v. Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), at 1103–04 para. 230 (S. Afr.).  
 240. See Plasket, supra note 226, at 43. Plasket states: 
Without the means of ensuring that the protection of the law can reach those who need 
it most, the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights would be in danger of 
being regarded by the majority of South Africans as empty promises or, perhaps worse, 
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continuing “[f]ear of the judicial process.”241 Some argued that a 
relaxed approach would result in vexatious and frivolous litigation, but 
the CCSA recognized that “it may sometimes be necessary to open the 
floodgates in order to irrigate the arid ground below them.”242 
2. Remedies and the Suspension of Invalidity.  The CCSA’s power 
to strike down legislative acts as unconstitutional is provided in section 
172, which states that “[w]hen deciding a constitutional matter within 
its power, a court . . . must declare that any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency.”243 And the court did not wait long to invoke its 
authority. In the 1995 case State v. Makwanyane,244 the CCSA 
invalidated the death penalty as unconstitutional.245 The CCSA’s 
strong statement upholding constitutional rights reminded observers of 
“the duty vested in the [c]ourts to interpret the Constitution and to 
uphold its provisions without fear or favour.”246 
Politically controversial, this decision could have threatened the 
fledgling court, as “South Africa’s high rate of violent crime and 
generally conservative public attitudes on capital punishment meant 
that the vast majority of South Africans . . . favored the retention of the 
death penalty.”247 But the use of the death penalty was also “closely 
associated with the violations and inequalities of the apartheid era,” 
and, as Theunis Roux explains, the political elite in the African 
National Congress (ANC) supported the court’s decision.248 The 
relationship between the single party system of elites and the broader 
public allowed the CCSA room to make such a decisive determination. 
 
a charter of luxuries available to the rich and powerful to entrench still further their 
positions of privilege. 
 Id. 
 241. Loots, Standing, supra note 227, at 49. 
 242. Wildlife Soc’y of S. Afr. v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 1996 (3) SA 1095 (Tk), 
at 1106E (S. Afr.). 
 243. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 172. 
 244. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 245. Id. at 520 para. 392. 
 246. Heinz Klug, Introducing the Devil: An Institutional Analysis of the Power of 
Constitutional Review, 13 SAJHR 185, 196 (1997) (quoting Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
at 431 para. 88). 
 247. Roux, supra note 237, at 118. 
 248. Id. at 120. Roux argues that, given this political context, “the CCSA’s overriding concern 
should be to manage it[s] relationship with the political branches.” Id. at 111.  
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With such a strong opening statement of judicial power, it may 
seem surprising that the court delayed its declaration of invalidity in 
State v. Ntuli.249 But this first exercise of remedial flexibility, authorized 
by section 172 of the Final Constitution, came at a moment of 
constitutional transition with great pressures on political actors. In 
Ntuli, the CCSA invalidated an Apartheid-era law that limited the 
appeal rights of convicts.250 The case itself was not contentious, but the 
court was aware that its determination would result in a dramatic 
expansion of the number of cases being appealed. Devising new 
procedures for an improved system of justice would be necessary.251 
The court concluded that “[t]o choose between [such procedures], to 
imagine others or to recommend any falls outside our province. The 
decision rests with Parliament.”252 The CCSA thus suspended its 
declaration of invalidity to allow Parliament to restructure the appeals 
process. 
Since Ntuli, however, the CCSA has delayed a suspension of 
invalidity in thirty-four cases, partially suspended remedies in three 
additional cases, and granted further extensions of suspensions in at 
least four cases.253 In some cases, the CCSA will issue interim orders to 
“modif[y] the law for the duration of the suspension, subject to 
legislative intervention.”254 These orders “need not represent the 
Court’s considered view as to the best way to cure the 
unconstitutionality; [they] may be simply a workable option for the 
time being.”255 
At one level, the recourse to remedial discretion and delayed 
suspensions of invalidity can be embedded in important separation-of-
powers issues, particularly in light of the wide variety of socioeconomic 
rights adjudicated by the CCSA.256 In this realm of positive rights, 
 
 249. State v. Ntuli, 1996 (1) SA 1207 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 250. Id. at 1216 para. 28. 
 251. Id. at 1216–17 para. 28. 
 252. Id. The court also recognized that “[t]he long perpetuation of an unconstitutional scheme 
is admittedly unfortunate. But the statute book cannot be purged suddenly of all its old elements 
that are now repugnant to the Constitution.” Id.  
 253. A table of relevant cases is on file with the Duke Law Journal.  
 254. ROBERT LECKEY, BILLS OF RIGHTS IN THE COMMON LAW 105 (2015). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court’s Construction of Socio-
Economic Rights: A Response to Critics, 19 CONN. J. OF INT’L L. 617, 618 (2004) (noting that “[t]he 
unelected Court is taking a substantial risk by treating these rights as justiciable”). 
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judicial capacity seems more in question,257 and the CCSA has a 
“strong preference for relying on legislative and executive measures to 
define the substance of these rights.”258 For example, commentators 
have noticed that the CCSA “has more readily relied on weaker 
remedies where the policy issues are relatively complex and need to be 
built up incrementally over time.”259 In fact, David Landau notes that, 
in these cases, an unsuspended invalidation “is likely to drive the court 
up against real constraints on its capacity,” raising the fear of political 
backlash and noncompliance.260 
Suspending a declaration of invalidity in the early days of a 
transitional regime is certainly a pragmatic decision; in socioeconomic 
cases, which may have a greater claim to arguments based in separation 
of powers, a suspension may be pragmatic or even principled. But in 
some cases, the suspension of invalidity looks strategic—avoidance 
“motivated by an often unstated concern for preserving institutional 
security.”261 
For example, in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie,262 the CCSA 
was confronted with a question concerning the common-law definition 
of marriage and the terms of the Marriage Act, both of which excluded 
lesbian and gay couples.263 The CCSA found such exclusion denied the 
applicants equal protection of the laws. But, as Roux points out, the 
court was also concerned about the security of the decision. At this 
time, public opinion in South Africa was “overwhelmingly 
conservative” on the issue of same-sex marriage, and there was 
“considerable disagreement within the ANC political elite” on “the 
issue of gay and lesbian equality.”264 The court could rely on neither 
the party elites nor the people for support. As the majority opinion 
concluded, “It is precisely because marriage plays such a profound role 
in terms of the way our society regards itself, that the exclusion from 
 
 257. Landau, supra note 15, at 251; see also Frank R. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 
UCLA L. Rev. 857, 862 (2001) (“[R]eliance on the judicial process to promote positive rights is 
an unpromising strategy.”). But see MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(2008) (arguing that weak-form judicial review can engage the courts while leaving space for the 
legislature to participate in the constitutional interpretation of positive rights).  
 258. Brian Ray, Evictions, Aspiration, and Avoidance, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 173, 175 (2014).  
 259. Landau, supra note 15, at 244 n. 2.  
 260. Id. at 263. 
 261. Ray, supra note 258, at 176. 
 262. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 535 para. 25 (S. Afr.). 
 263. Id. at 538 para. 33. 
 264. Roux, supra note 237, at 120, 122. 
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the common law and Marriage Act of same-sex couples is so injurious, 
and that the foundation for the construction of new paradigms needs 
to be steadily and securely laid.”265 The court therefore concluded that 
Parliament would have one year from the date of the decision to 
remedy the defect in the Marriage Act. 
In discussing the balance struck by the CCSA in Fourie, Roux 
suggests that, by using ex post dialogue, the court is able to maintain its 
principled position—but questions remain about “the way in which the 
CCSA should go about building public support for decisions of 
constitutional principle.”266 It may be that the remedial release valve 
allows for the principled adjudication of the rights claim in the first 
instance. One challenge to this position is the concern that arguments 
for dialogue and “security” may “devolve into outright deference,”267 
leading to “a combination of weak institutional authority and 
expansive legislative (and executive) power that would marginalize the 
judicial role.”268  
In a positive light, the ability to suspend declarations of invalidity 
can help the CCSA construct its own balance between legal and 
institutional legitimacy.269 Indeed, some argue that the CCSA has made 
the right choice in “selecting only a few cases on which to expend its 
institutional capital,”270 which has allowed it to build a “reputation for 
legally credible decision making.”271 This recourse to remedial 
discretion is a serious weapon in the CCSA’s armory for self-
protection; however, it comes at a certain cost. If justice delayed is 
justice denied, there are dangers to the CCSA’s institutional legitimacy 
in using the ex post mechanism. 
B. Canadian Delayed Declarations 
1. The Backdrop: Standing and Notwithstanding.  The Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC) also operates in a historical, cultural, political, 
 
 265. Fourie, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC), at 583 para. 155.  
 266. Roux, supra note 237, at 122. 
 267. Ray, supra note 258, at 191. 
 268. Id. at 179.  
 269. See Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial Delays, 91 TUL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 32–45), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2784267 
[https://perma.cc/2PTT-LYYF] (arguing that the CCSA’s decision to delay the remedy in Fourie 
helped mitigate backlash and enhanced the court’s legitimacy).  
 270. Mark S. Kende, The Fifth Anniversary of the South African Constitutional Court: In 
Defense of Judicial Pragmatism, 26 VT. L. REV. 753, 766 (2002). 
 271. Roux, supra note 237, at 137. 
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and constitutional context that makes ex post, as opposed to ex ante, 
avoidance more feasible. This Section focuses first on the flexibility 
with which litigants can access the SCC through generous standing 
rules and grant applications, as well as through the reference 
mechanism—access that limits opportunities for ex ante avoidance. It 
then turns to the creative constitutional provision—the 
notwithstanding clause—designed to allow for political review of the 
court’s decisions. This provision may have (unintentionally and 
surprisingly) encouraged the SCC to utilize ex post avoidance 
techniques. 
Rooted in the developed common-law understanding of limited 
standing, Canadian jurisprudence took a dramatic shift in the mid-
1970s, leading to what is now described as one of the “most lax” 
regimes in the common-law world.272 The SCC first allowed public 
interest groups to join cases as intervenors;273 then, it established 
broader public-interest standing in a set of opinions known as the 
“standing trilogy.”274 The looser test asked whether the plaintiff was 
directly affected by the legislation in question, “or, if not, [whether] the 
plaintiff ha[s] a genuine interest in its validity.”275 Another prong of the 
test—asking whether there is “another reasonable and effective way to 
bring the issue before the Court”276—has since been further relaxed in 
application.277 The Canadian liberalization of standing law began 
 
 272. IAN BRODIE, FRIENDS OF THE COURT: THE PRIVILEGING OF INTEREST GROUP 
LITIGANTS IN CANADA 27 (2002); see EMMETT MACFARLANE, GOVERNING FROM THE BENCH: 
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 44 (2012).  
 273. See Morgentaler v. R., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, 616 (Can.) (allowing several public interest 
groups to intervene in a politically sensitive abortion case).  
 274. See MACFARLANE, supra note 272, at 44; FREDERICK LEE MORTON, LAW, POLITICS 
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CANADA 289 (F. L. Mortan ed., 3d ed. 2002). The cases were: 
Minister of Justice v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 (Can.) (challenging abortion laws); Nova 
Scotia Bd. of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (Can.) (challenging film censorship laws); 
Thorson v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (Can.) (challenging federal bilingualism 
legislation).  
 275. Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), [1992] 1 
S.C.R. 236, 238 (Can.). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See, e.g., Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against 
Violence Soc’y, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524, 546 (Can.) (“Cory J. emphasized this point in Canadian 
Council of Churches where he noted that the factors to be considered in exercising this discretion 
should not be treated as technical requirements and that the principles governing the exercise of 
this discretion should be interpreted in a liberal and generous manner.”); see also Linda McKay-
Panos, Standing Up for Your Rights, LAWNOW (Mar. 1, 2013), http:///www.lawnow.org/standing-
up-for-your-rights [https://perma.cc/A4K2-Z6D9] (noting that the relaxation of this third factor 
may help public interest groups who have faced difficulties establishing standing in the past).  
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before, but was largely developed in conjunction with, the enactment 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 (Charter).278 And this 
shift has helped “legislatures, judges and rights advocacy groups alike” 
to develop Charter rights.279 
Much like the U.S. Supreme Court, the SCC has “virtually 
complete control over its own docket” and can pick and choose from 
among the applicants it grants leave to appeal.280 Unlike in the United 
States, however, the Canadian institutional context appears to 
generate “role-related norms [that] have a powerful constraining effect 
on judicial choices regarding leave.”281 The “‘absence of an en banc 
tradition and the use of panels complicates and adds uncertainty to the 
justices’ ability to act strategically.”282 Furthermore, since 1995, staff 
lawyers, rather than law clerks, have had responsibility for writing the 
recommendations on leave to appeal (though law clerks may review or 
advise their justice). This bureaucratic shift may have “produced a 
stabilizing effect on the outcome of leave applications,”283 limiting 
strategic or politicized determinations. 
The combination of liberal standing rules and a more technocratic 
grant process for hearing cases diminishes the opportunities for ex ante 
strategic action by the SCC to protect its institutional legitimacy. Any 
flexibility the SCC might have is further constrained by the ability of 
other governmental actors themselves to use the SCC strategically 
through the reference procedure. 
Through the reference mechanism, questions are referred to the 
SCC by the federal government (or on appeal from provincial 
governments that have asked questions of the provincial courts of 
appeal). The Supreme Court Act requires the SCC to hear and 
consider these questions,284 though they are “often divorced from any 
 
 278. See CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter CHARTER].  
 279. Ran Hirschl, Canada’s Contribution to the Comparative Study of Rights and Judicial 
Review, in THE COMPARATIVE TURN IN CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE 77, 79 (Linda White et 
al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Hirschl, Canada’s Contribution]. 
 280. See Christopher P. Manfredi, “Appropriate and Just in the Circumstances”: Public Policy 
and the Enforcement of Rights Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 27 CAN. J. 
POL. SCI. 435, 443 (1994). On the leave to appeal process, see MACFARLANE, supra note 272, at 
78–89. 
 281. MACFARLANE, supra note 272, at 78. 
 282. Id. at 81 (quoting ROY B. FLEMMING, TOURNAMENT OF APPEALS: GRANTING JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN CANADA 100 (2004)).  
 283. Id. at 85. 
 284. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 53(4). 
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existing dispute or firm factual foundation.”285 The court “has 
repeatedly asserted the discretion to refuse to answer a reference 
question,” though “it has rarely exercised such discretion.”286 In fact, it 
is the reference mechanism that “has plunged the Supreme Court of 
Canada . . . into some of the major political disputes of the day.”287 In 
the past almost 150 years, the SCC has addressed roughly “ninety 
reference cases, including some of the most significant rulings in 
Canadian constitutional history.”288 
Why doesn’t the reference mechanism itself threaten the court? 
Theorists argue that “[b]acklash should be more likely when [a] 
decision is salient enough to send a signal to an otherwise inattentive 
public and simple enough for the public to understand it and react 
unfavorably.”289 But a referred question is likely to have already 
garnered tremendous political attention, and the mechanism may be a 
way for political actors to avoid a difficult decision. Of course, 
affirmative requests for advisory opinions from the government raise 
the specter of noncompliance, and, in these cases, the court must tread 
lightly. But the fact that political actors want the judiciary to resolve a 
difficult issue cuts in favor of their adhering to a deft decision from the 
court.290 And the SCC’s carefully constructed responses are often 
applauded for their nuance and thoughtfulness.291 
The SCC also operates against the background of a creative 
constitutional regime that sanctions governmental noncompliance with 
 
 285. THOMAS A. CROMWELL, LOCUS STANDI: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF STANDING 
IN CANADA 175 (1986). 
 286. MACFARLANE, supra note 272, at 88. But see Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 698, 701 (Can.) (declining to answer whether opposite-sex requirements established in the 
common law and in the civil law of Quebec were consistent with the Charter).  
 287. Richard Devlin, A. Wayne MacKay & Natasha Kim, Reducing the Democratic Deficit: 
Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a “Triple P” Judiciary, 38 ALTA 
L. REV. 734, 754 (2000). 
 288. Hirschl, Canada’s Contribution, supra note 279, at 78. 
 289. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 3, 12 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008).  
 290. Cf. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislature Deference to the 
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 38–45 (1993) (detailing the occasional practice of legislative 
deference to the courts on controversial issues). See generally Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of 
Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93, 97 (2008) (describing 
“[s]trategic political deference to the judiciary alongside politically astute judicial behavior”). 
 291. See S.T.C., Mar. 25, 2014 (B.J.C., No. 87, p. 95) (Spain) (looking to SCC Secession 
Reference for guidance in its own determination about the constitutionality of a referendum of 
self-determination in Catalonia). See generally Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of 
Legal Transplantation, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & 
John D. Donahue eds., 2000). 
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court’s decisions: section 33 of the Charter, known as the 
notwithstanding clause.292 The clause permits the federal, or a 
provincial, legislature to allow for the continued operation of a law, 
notwithstanding its incompatibility with a provision of the Charter. In 
effect, it functions as an override clause, allowing a legislature to 
reenact a law struck down by the SCC. It can also work to insulate laws 
from judicial review if a declaration is made at the outset that such a 
law may operate notwithstanding a conflict.293 The time limit for either 
provision is five years. 
It is not clear how precisely the notwithstanding clause affects the 
background expectations of the SCC or how it might influence strategic 
decisionmaking by the court. In theory, the existence of a lawful 
noncompliance mechanism might militate in favor of more generalized 
compliance by political actors.294 Further, given that a legislative 
override is constitutional, its use might not necessarily harm the SCC’s 
institutional legitimacy. The absence of judicial supremacy is not 
equivalent to judicial illegitimacy. Any individual override may have 
no effect on the willingness of the public, the coordinate branches, or 
the provincial governments to comply with other SCC decisions in the 
future. 
At a more practical level, however, the notwithstanding power has 
not been used by the federal Parliament, and “some commentators 
discern a nascent convention that it should not be.”295 Due to this fact, 
Adrian Vermeule classifies it as an “atrophied power”—one no longer 
with any teeth to bite.296 Ran Hirschl cautions that to “describe it as a 
political ‘dead letter’ would be an exaggeration,” but he notes that 
there have only been “a handful of significant instances” in which the 
clause has been invoked.297 Given its lack of use at the federal level thus 
far, a federal invocation of the notwithstanding clause now might have 
 
 292. CHARTER, supra note 278, at sec. 33.  
 293. See generally Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: 
Lessons from the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 255 (2001) 
(discussing “pre-emptive uses” of the notwithstanding mechanism). 
 294. There are indications that Canadian governments and executives are fairly rule abiding. 
See Mary Liston, Delayed Declarations of Invalidity: Deferential Dialogue or Justice Deferred? 
18 (June 4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that “few 
governments or Crown actors will risk public opprobrium for disobeying a court order”). 
 295. Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
421, 425 (2012). 
 296. Id. at 423, 425. 
 297. Hirschl, Canada’s Contribution, supra note 279, at 80. 
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a more dramatic and threatening impact on the court, perhaps making 
the SCC wary of pushing too far in rights development. 
2. Remedies and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity.  Against a 
markedly different backdrop of both constrained power and extensive 
flexibility than that of other courts, the SCC has moved to a remedial 
approach that encourages legislative participation in resolving thorny 
political issues. The timing of this move may have undercut the need 
for the notwithstanding clause; its lack of use may be a reflection of the 
SCC’s ability to manage potential stressors to its relationships with the 
political branches. 
As in South Africa, the first case in which the SCC used a delayed 
declaration of invalidity was one that presented a unique situation: a 
referred question asking whether the requirements of the 
Constitutional Act 1867 and the Manitoba Act 1870—to provide laws 
in both French and English—were mandatory.298 The SCC concluded 
that they were mandatory, a result which threatened “all legal rights, 
obligations and other effects which have purportedly arisen under all 
Acts of the Manitoba Legislature since 1890 . . . to the extent that their 
validity and enforceability depends upon a regime of unconstitutional 
unilingual laws.”299 The SCC, recognizing the danger of a legal vacuum, 
delayed its declaration of invalidity to give the Manitoba government 
time to translate, reenact, print, and publish the acts of the Manitoba 
Legislature. 
Beyond that instance of a legal vacuum, the SCC has also found 
delayed declarations to be authorized when necessary to avoid a 
danger to the public.300 The current instantiation of the doctrine, 
however, is largely justified on theories of comparative institutional 
competence.301 Because Charter cases “have distributional 
implications for many groups, . . . the courts often have good reason to 
remand complex remedial issues to legislatures.”302 These remedies are 
rarely geared toward vindicating socioeconomic rights, which the SCC 
 
 298. Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 748 (Can.). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Schacter v. Canada (Emp’t & Immigration Comm’n), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 684 (Can.) 
(concluding that the decision to delay a declaration of invalidity “should not turn on 
considerations of the role of the courts and the legislature but rather on considerations relating 
to the effect of an immediate declaration on the public”). 
 301. See Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and 
Legislative Constitutional Remedies, 21 SUP. CT. L. REV. 205, 231 (2003). 
 302. Id. at 252. 
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has been reluctant to find in the Charter,303 so the concern about 
controlling the public fisc is only partly engaged. In fact, in the most 
recent decision delaying a declaration, Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. 
Bedford,304 the SCC suggested that whether an issue “is a matter of 
great public concern” contributes to its decision regarding legislative 
remand.305 This formulation seems expressly designed to aid the court 
in avoiding contentious political or social questions.306 
Unlike in South Africa, in Canada no constitutional text 
authorizes delays. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act 1982 states 
that, when a law is found to be inconsistent with the Constitution, it is 
“to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.”307 The SCC’s 
effort to fashion a remedial dialogue with the various legislatures in 
Canada may have some intuitive force in the shadow of the 
notwithstanding clause, but it is not an explicit privilege given to the 
court.308 Yet since the Manitoba Language Rights Reference,309 the 
delayed declaration of invalidity has become the “preferred remedy in 
Canadian public law.”310 In fact, “a majority of the Court has suspended 
its remedy in twenty judgments allowing challenges to legislation under 
the Charter,” and “more than a dozen dissenting judgments would 
have suspended the remedy” in other cases.311 
The advantages to the SCC of legislative remand include the 
ability to sidestep situations that are politically fraught or likely to 
 
 303. See R. v. Propser, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (Can.) (“[I]t would be a very big step for this court 
to interpret the Charter in a manner which imposes a positive constitutional obligation on 
governments.”); see also Hirschl, Canada’s Contribution, supra note 279, at 84 (describing 
socioeconomic rights as “not protected by the charter” and “excluded from its purview by 
pertinent SCC jurisprudence”). 
 304. Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1102 (Can.). 
 305. Id. at 1164.  
 306. Cf. MACFARLANE, supra note 272, at 171 (describing one way of understanding 
suspended declarations of invalidity as being “new weapons recently added to the justices’ 
strategic arsenal to avoid more direct conflict or political acrimony with the other branches”). 
 307. Part VII of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 
(U.K.) s. 52(1).  
 308. Cf. Rosalind Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference 4 
(U. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 284, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1520789 [https://perma.cc/Y8R8-8TB7] (discussing notwithstanding clause as “as a valuable 
incentive for (and a textual confirmation of the desirability of)” a dialogic approach). 
 309. Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (Can.). 
 310. LECKEY, supra note 254, at 103. 
 311. Id. The use of the remedy is also prevalent in the lower courts. See Choudhry & Roach, 
supra note 301, at 228–29 (listing cases through 2003). 
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result in weak compliance.312 But “punting” remedial issues to the 
legislature has some downsides.313 One may be in the quality of the 
remedy: the individual litigant wins only a Pyrrhic victory if a 
prospective legislative remedy is all that is available. The claimant “can 
claim a moral victory for winning on the merits, but in concrete terms, 
receives no relief whatsoever.”314 Another pitfall is in managing the 
period of delay itself. The decision of the SCC to delay the declaration 
of invalidity in Bedford engendered a tremendous amount of 
criticism.315 The court had concluded that the laws prohibiting bawdy 
houses functioned to deprive sex workers of their constitutional rights 
to security of the person.316 But the delayed declaration left the 
criminal laws in place, threatening continued criminal sanctions against 
sex-workers using bawdy houses, in violation of their rights. As Robert 
Leckey wrote, “[T]hat the sex workers should exit the courthouse as 
‘victors’ while continuing to bear the brunt of laws shown to violate 
their fundamental rights . . . weaken[s] constitutional review in 
Canada.”317 
A question raised by this case, therefore, is whether the SCC has 
properly calibrated its response to the countermajoritarian paradox: If 
it strays too far in a majoritarian direction (to mitigate the 
countermajoritarian difficulty), it may cease to have the authority to 
operate as the guardian of the constitution and enforce 
countermajoritarian rights.318 When it is obvious that remedial delay is 
about “accommodat[ing] opposition to [a] decision,”319 the court may 
be seen as failing to do its job. As Choudhry and Roach admonish, 
 
 312. See Manfredi, supra note 280, at 447 (“One of the important themes in the literature is 
that effective implementation of judicial decrees often depends on whether the Court’s decision 
is prohibitory in nature or requires an active response on the part of state officials, with 
prohibitory orders more likely to be followed.”). 
 313. Choudhry & Roach, supra note 301, at 228. 
 314. Id. at 243. 
 315. See LECKEY, supra note 254, at 148.  
 316. Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, 1135–36 (Can.). 
 317. Robert Leckey, Suspended Declarations of Invalidity and the Rule of Law, U.K. CONST. 
L. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org [https://perma.cc/3VKM-868G].  
 318. Note that some argue there is less of a countermajoritarian role for the SCC in 
interpreting the Charter because of its open-ended articulation of rights. See Peter W. Hogg & 
Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 82–91 (1997). See 
generally Dixon, supra note 308 (collecting sources).  
 319. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 615 (1983).  
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“The broader purposes of the Charter are ill served when a successful 
Charter applicant receives no remedies.”320 
V.  STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Without extensive empirical research into the dynamics of each 
system, it is impossible to tell whether these courts have actually 
protected, maintained, or increased their sociological legitimacy in the 
legal systems in which they operate. But, assuming that avoidance and 
dialogue can have such a result, these comparative examples highlight 
the key operational questions discussed in Part I: How should dialogue 
be constructed? Should courts be open about the extent of their 
institutional weaknesses? What kind of avoidance regime best allows 
for judicial flexibility in the future? This Part fleshes out some of the 
trade-offs inherent in these choices and speculates on a few of the 
factors that might influence a court’s decision to avoid. 
A. Timing and the Quality of Dialogue 
If the goal of avoidance or delay is to allow some social consensus 
to develop in order to “secure” a future decision, part of that 
calculation includes whether and how the court itself will contribute to 
the debate. The U.S. Supreme Court can only eavesdrop when it uses 
justiciability doctrines to avoid adjudication. And when it denies 
certiorari in a one-line order, the Court does not give others permission 
to engage: the political branches take risks to act in an ostensibly open 
substantive area without guidance or engagement. By contrast—and 
even as they are more candid about their weaknesses—the European, 
South African, and Canadian courts are also more active participants 
in the ongoing conversations surrounding the divisive issues that may 
threaten their legitimacy. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court may maintain control of the issues 
it hears through its use of the passive virtues, it has a lesser ability to 
construct and monitor a dialogue with the political branches. 
Justiciability doctrines have not lent themselves to dialogue in the way 
Bickel might have hoped: they are determined in advance of the legal 
issues in the case and any commentary on the merits of the case would 
take the shape of an impermissible advisory opinion. 
To the extent the U.S. Supreme Court is able to create a dialogue 
through its use of justiciability doctrines, that dialogue is among the 
 
 320. Choudhry & Roach, supra note 301, at 247. 
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lower courts in the judicial system, which may choose to hear cases and 
develop approaches to the sensitive issues at hand. The “percolation” 
in the lower courts is one way that the Court can monitor legal 
developments and social responses to divisive issues. But one danger 
of the creeping constitutionalization of standing is to the vibrancy of 
this dialogue. 
The other courts engage in more robust and self-conscious 
dialogue, but this dialogue occurs at different times: in medio in the 
ECtHR and ex post in the CCSA and SCC. Although all the courts 
have some ability to influence the dialogue, the scope and depth of that 
participation varies. 
When using the margin of appreciation, the ECtHR will ask the 
national courts and legislatures to work in partnership with it to 
achieve the goals of the Convention.321 The flexibility in the margin 
approach, combined with the decreased pressure to make a final 
determination on any individual limitation, allows the ECtHR some 
space to promote consensus beyond merely seeking its evidence.322 The 
margin, a “convenient subterfuge,”323 might serve as a long-term, 
minority-protecting “mechanism to prod nations to update their 
policies gradually to emerging new standards.”324 And some research 
suggests that ECtHR judgments “influence[] some countries to adopt 
progressive policies earlier than they otherwise would have” as well as 
significantly and substantially increase the probability of policy change, 
even in countries that are not party to the dispute.325 When it has room 
to maneuver, the ECtHR can serve as the moderator of the rights 
debate, setting the agenda and the time limit for discussion.326 And it 
maintains the final determination. In this best light, the ECtHR “allows 
 
 321. See supra note 203. 
 322. Cf. YOUROW, supra note 167, at 195 (“Is the Court merely reflecting the sum total of 
national law and practice within the Council of Europe family of nations, or actively shaping a 
hitherto non-existent European consensus?”). 
 323. Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and International Standards, 33 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 851 (1999). 
 324. Id. at 852. 
 325. Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, Do European Court of Human Rights Judgments 
Promote Legal and Policy Change? 36 (Apr. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/HelferVoeten.Chicago.IL_.Workshop.14April.2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SS8K-5GCL]. 
 326. Cf. YOUROW, supra note 167, at 195 (“ECtHR judgments can put an issue on the 
domestic agenda.”). 
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for the participation of state powers in the elaboration and application 
of a norm, to better control their activity.”327  
Of course, there are downsides to this approach: in areas in which 
no European-wide consensus seems likely (such as in religious freedom 
cases), the ECtHR has little ability to influence the debate.328 And 
cajoling can take time. The slow narrowing of the margin of 
appreciation in the transsexual-rights cases in the United Kingdom 
took over 16 years,329 and the British have a history of adhering to the 
rule of law.330 Furthermore, the opportunity for dialogue with national 
courts may make it more difficult for the European court to fashion 
uniform rules, if the unique national basis for a deviation is reaffirmed 
by the nation’s highest courts.331 
By contrast, both the Canadian and South African courts conduct 
their dialogue ex post, as the legislature is fashioning remedies for the 
 
 327. KASTANAS, supra note 112, at 68 (author’s translation). 
 328. For example, Article 9 of the Convention, guaranteeing freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, has been extensively litigated in areas of high political salience—but without a 
consensus on the matter there is no “benchmark enforceable by the Court.” Dimitrios Kyritsis & 
Stavros Tsakyrakis, Neutrality in the Classroom, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 200, 215 (2011). And the 
court has not sought to encourage the various European countries to work toward a shared 
understanding of the relationship between religious freedom and laicité or religious 
establishment. In Lautsi v. Italy, the ECtHR concluded that Italy had considerable leeway in 
“design[ing] the public school environment in a way that reconciles the individual demands of 
religious conscience with other public goals,” thus allowing the display of crucifixes in the 
classroom as within the nation’s margin of appreciation. Kyritsis & Tsakyrakis, supra, at 216 
(citing Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 11, 2011)). See generally Joseph 
Weiler, Editorial, Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (critiquing 
the ECtHR’s decision in Lautsi). And recent cases on wearing the burqa in public places in France 
and Turkey resulted in the ECtHR finding a wide margin of appreciation for the national 
authorities in determining rules surrounding “the public expression of a religious belief.” Sahin v. 
Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173; S.AS. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341; see Hakeem 
Yusuf, S.A.S. v. France: Supporting ‘Living Together’ or Forced Assimilation, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 277, 281 (2014). 
 329. See supra note 195. 
 330. The United Kingdom is ranked twelfth out of all countries in the World Justice Project’s 
Rule of Law Index, see WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 6 (2015), and has a fairly 
strong record in responding to adverse ECtHR decisions, see Dia Anagnostou & Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi, Domestic Implementation of Human Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure 
and Government Effectiveness Matter, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 205, 217 (2014). One recent failing has 
been the U.K.’s reluctance to rethink its prisoner voting ban, judged by the ECtHR to violate the 
Convention. See Delaney, supra note 5, at 583–84 n.236.  
 331. See Delaney, supra note 5, at 587–89 (discussing the U.K. Supreme Court’s decision on 
the topic of hearsay evidence in R. v. Horncastle [2009] U.K.S.C. 14, [2010] 2 W.L.R. 47 (appeal 
taken from Eng.), and its effect on dialogue with the ECtHR). 
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rights violations the courts have adjudicated.332 In both countries, the 
courts are often willing to give guidance,333 and occasionally the SCC 
will “formulate a remedy that will come in effect should the legislature 
not enact constitutional legislation by the court’s deadline.”334 This 
approach, however, can result in bureaucratic politicking at the 
legislative level.335 Sometimes the SCC retains jurisdiction “to allow 
both the government and the successful Charter applicants to return to 
the Court during the period of the delay,”336 but again, this does not 
operate automatically. In South Africa, the CCSA regularly issues 
interim orders, often providing some intermediary remedy during the 
period of delay. This “iterative approach” has benefits.337 These orders 
begin the conversation with the legislative branch, providing “a 
workable option for the time being,” without delineating the court’s 
ultimate view on the appropriate remedy.338 
Brian Ray argues that the CCSA’s strategic avoidance techniques 
may force the court “toward[] a position of weak institutional authority 
that severely constrains its capacity to act as an independent partner in 
developing and implementing the social rights provisions.”339 
Certainly, once a court has deferred to a legislative remedy, it may 
struggle to act as an independent partner. But should it declare right 
and remedy itself, a court fails to act as a partner at all. Thus, the critical 
question that deserves further research is how a court can be an 
effective partner: through a Canadian-style hard-stop remedy at the 
back end (should the legislature fail to act), or by taking a first crack at 
an interim solution that the legislature can alter? 
 
 332. There may be special importance to dialogue for socioeconomic rights that may 
otherwise fail to be enforced at all. See Landau, supra note 15, at 245. See generally Dixon, supra 
note 33 (focusing on socioeconomic rights in South Africa).  
 333. See LECKEY, supra note 254, at 105.  
 334. Choudhry & Roach, supra note 301, at 233. 
 335. Manfredi, supra note 280, at 462 (noting the possibility in remedial decree litigation of 
bureaucratic politics playing a role: “[A]n agency that finds itself under court order to remedy 
constitutional violations enjoys an automatic advantage in the competitive internal game of 
budgetary politics”). 
 336. Choudhry & Roach, supra note 301, at 233.  
 337. See Landau, supra note 15, at 250 n.27 (citing Charles Sabel & William Simon, 
Destabilizing Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1081 (2004), 
as “explain[ing] the benefits of an iterative approach to public law remedies”). 
 338. Id. 
 339. Ray, supra note 258, at 10. 
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B. Candor and Judicial Capacity 
In the brief review of the theoretical literature in Part I, arguments 
for candor seem best aligned with increased institutional legitimacy for 
a court. But the U.S. Supreme Court has been successful in 
constructing its legitimacy through an opaque method of avoiding 
substantive rulings. Indeed, it is this “covert deployment” of prudential 
considerations that riles critics of the passive virtues.340 As his critics 
have noted in distress, “Bickel’s theory actually requires the Justices to 
lie.”341 And about what? About the weakness of the Court, the 
potential harm to the Court of deciding a divisive case, and the 
constraints faced by a judicial institution with neither force nor will. In 
fact, when the Supreme Court has been open about its need to balance 
prudence and principle,342 it has been roundly criticized.343 This opacity 
has allowed the Supreme Court to accrue power mostly out of the 
public eye, and the approach does not directly threaten its claim to 
fulfill the countermajoritarian aspiration. 
When an opaque result seems preferable, “it is always important, 
before endorsing a lack of candor in a particular situation, to consider 
the alternatives.”344 The ECtHR’s use of the margin of appreciation 
provides an insight into how candid avoidance works: the margin of 
appreciation is an open acknowledgement of the limits of judicial 
power. As noted above, the touchstone of the margin approach is 
consensus, and the court is clear about its willingness to uphold state 
limitations on rights while awaiting the development of a European 
norm on a particular issue. This approach has dialogic benefits 
(discussed above), but if the ECtHR is truly constrained by consensus, 
it loses the capacity—both as a doctrinal matter and in terms of its 
institutional legitimacy—to fulfill the countermajoritarian aspiration 
and to serve as the protector of the minority in the face of a rights-
violating majority.345 This court-created constraint may become even 
 
 340. Hellman, supra note 27, at 1123. 
 341. Id. at 1149.  
 342.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1992) (plurality 
opinion).  
 343. See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 995, 1001 (2003); Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 1980, 1985–91 (2002).  
 344. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 746 (citing SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE LIFE 88, 103, 188–89 (1978)). 
 345. See Martens, supra note 191, at 58 (“By yielding to a consensus whose absence or 
existence is based on the will or refusal of a majority, are the courts not granting that majority 
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more meaningful as European states seek to entrench the doctrine to 
limit the ECtHR’s reach. Protocol Number 15, which is in the 
ratification process,346 would add the concept to the Preamble of the 
Convention itself.347 
The Canadian and South African courts’ ex post approach is 
candid about aspects of judicial weakness in enforcing remedies but 
retains elements of the countermajoritarian aspiration. That each court 
will rule on the substantive legal issue allows a principled resolution of 
the legal claim, but arguments rooted in institutional competence can 
affect the amount of deference shown to the legislature or executive. 
The best use of these self-effacing claims is in the area of 
socioeconomic rights, in which the delay occasioned by a legislative 
remand reflects the courts’ dislike for making straightforward demands 
on the public fisc. But when couched in broader and more general 
terms of institutional competence, these remedial approaches can 
expand far beyond the realm of positive rights, leading to an overly 
deferential relationship with the elected branches. Furthermore, a 
large mismatch between right and remedy may undermine the legal 
legitimacy accrued by the initial principled determination of the 
claim.348 
The dangers inherent in the more candid approaches to 
institutional weakness lie in the path dependency of doctrine and in the 
opportunities for the strategic use of the courts’ approaches by 
nonjudicial actors.349 Analyzing comparative institutional competence 
 
undue rule-making power, given that their role in relation to human rights is precisely to protect 
members of minorities from the intolerance of the majority?”). Cf. Robert Blackburn, Current 
Developments, Assessment, and Prospects, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE 76, 81 (Robert 
Blackburn & Jörg Polakiewicz eds., 2001) (discussing the critique that the margin of appreciation 
“allows individual states to evade the standards of human rights practice shared elsewhere in 
Europe”); James A. Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 466 (2005).  
 346. Protocol No. 15 has not yet entered into force but has been ratified by twenty-four 
countries thus far. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF 
TREATY 213, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=213&CM=7&DF
=30/09/2015&CL=ENG [https://perma.cc/JHY4-GKPK]. 
 347. See Dean Spielmann, President, Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, Current Legal Problems 
Lecture: Whither the Margin of Appreciation? (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Speech_20140320_London_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9QT-LXAF]. 
 348. Kate Hofmeyr, A Central-Case Analysis of Constitutional Remedial Power, 125 S. AFR. 
L.J. 521, 523 (2008) (“The effect of entrenchment is instead a contingent matter that depends on 
the remedial approach of the courts . . . .”). 
 349. Cf. Friedman & Delaney, supra note 64, at 1190 (discussing the ways in which doctrine 
can constrain courts and structure the arguments available to litigants).  
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or searching for consensus creates space for other players to participate 
in the legitimacy game. There are benefits, but giving up complete 
control makes the courts vulnerable. They may find their strategies for 
avoiding institutional threats are being used to limit their power to 
fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. 
C. Deciding to Avoid: Factors for Further Study 
The snapshot of avoidance that this Article presents does not seek 
to identify the various factors that might influence a court’s decision to 
use avoidance or to provide explanations for why, or when, a court 
might choose to navigate the issues of timing and candor in a particular 
way. But this final Section suggests some plausible areas for further 
study—including the internal institutional dynamics of a court, the 
judicial architecture of the legal system, and how well judges can be 
expected to understand and predict political threats or popular 
support. Disaggregating and examining these various factors might 
allow scholars to predict when a court could be expected to avoid. 
First, the internal workings of an individual court will likely be of 
critical relevance to the question of when and how a court might avoid. 
Are the judges able to confer in advance about strategic aims? Are they 
in agreement? The Justices of the Warren Court were known to 
negotiate and communicate outside of conference.350 And Bickel 
suggests that, in Naim v. Naim, the Justices all knew the correct answer 
as a matter of constitutional law but agreed to avoid hearing the case 
due to the potential political backlash if they found the state 
miscegenation law unconstitutional. This example suggests that the 
ability of a multimember court to agree on avoidance and to keep such 
a decision opaque might be a function of court cohesiveness and the 
manner in which the court conducts its internal decisionmaking 
procedures. 
The internal processes of the ECtHR may help explain why that 
court has preferred the margin of appreciation approach. The judges 
on the ECtHR operate against a background principle of 
interpretation that gives “priority to rights,” requiring rights “to be 
 
 350. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 164–68 (1982) (discussing 
efforts by Justice Frankfurter and Chief Justice Warren to negotiate for a unanimous decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education through informal lunches); Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan: Legacy 
of a Champion, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1151, 1159–65 (2013) (describing Brennan’s “rule of five” and 
his efforts to build consensus on the Warren Court). 
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interpreted broadly and the exceptions narrowly.”351 This priority 
principle serves as a type of ratchet, ensuring the expansion of rights 
over time. Judges who cohere around this background norm—as most 
do, due to the mechanisms of appointment and acculturation—may 
find it easier to use the margin of appreciation doctrine in order to push 
the dialogue in a particular direction.352 And the mechanisms of 
deliberation at the ECtHR allow for discussion and deliberation before 
the conference takes place, permitting the reporting judge (juge 
rapporteur) to construct an opinion amenable to all.353 
Another possible factor that could influence a court’s decision to 
avoid is the broader judicial architecture of the underlying legal system. 
In the European Convention system, the ECtHR’s reliance on the 
individual national courts for ensuring the effectiveness of its rulings 
complicates its enforcement power. Some of the ECtHR’s dialogue is 
with national courts themselves, as the European-level court attempts 
to learn the political limits and manage the doctrinal constructs of the 
national systems.354 Similarly, in the United States, the Supreme Court 
may choose to foster dialogue within the lower federal courts, waiting 
until they have engaged with and ruled on contentious issues before 
resolving the question at the national level.355 This “dialogue” can even 
happen after a decision, truly ex post, as lower courts “narrow from 
 
 351. Greer, supra note 148, at 413.  
 352. See Nina-Louisa Arold, The European Court of Human Rights as an Example of 
Convergence, 76 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 305, 321 (2007) (arguing that the court “creates its own 
distinctive legal culture through merging diversities”); id. at 307–08 (noting that some judges have 
“extensive overseas studies and experience in international and human rights law”). But see 
Loukis G. Loucaides, Reflections of a Former European Court of Human Rights Judge on His 
Experiences as a Judge, EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTRE (July 26, 2010), http://www.errc.org/ 
article/roma-rights-1-2010-implementation-of-judgments/3613/8 [https://perma.cc/H28R-SJNG] 
(discussing the negative consequences of appointing judges with no “background acquaintance 
with human rights”).  
 353. Cf. Mathilde Cohen, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Deliberations: Two Models of Judicial 
Deliberations in Courts of Last Resort, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 951, 954 (2014) (“The reporting judge’s 
main task is to propose a disposition and draft an opinion before the oral argument and conference 
meeting take place.”).  
 354. See Delaney, supra note 5, at 561, 575–76, 590. 
 355. Many Supreme Court certiorari memos discuss the need for further “percolation” in the 
courts of appeals, to allow an issue to be vetted by a number of other judges before rising to the 
Supreme Court level. See generally Zachary Wallander & Sara C. Benesh, Clerks as Advisors: A 
Look at the Blackmun Papers, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2014) (discussing this phenomenon). 
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below” and occasionally mitigate the harmful consequences of the 
Court’s errors.356 
Finally, the most important factor is how well a court understands 
its potential threats and reserves of support—in short, whether the 
court is fully aware of the political dynamic in which it operates.357 In 
South Africa, for example, the CCSA did not avoid or delay when 
invalidating the death penalty in State v. Makwanyane. The Justices 
understood that, although the public was opposed, elites in government 
supported the result, protecting the court from government-led 
sanctions and suggesting that any popular backlash would be 
contained.358 In general, whether judges possess such political savvy 
may be a function of their previous positions and actions, their 
connections and networks, and the quality and diversity of media 
outlets.359  
Assessing political dynamics could also be more or less difficult 
depending upon the nature of the political system. In a multiparty 
political system, a court may trade on diffuse support from the people 
to protect itself from a divided or fractious elected government. But in 
a one-party system, such as South Africa’s, a court may find that its 
primary audience consists of its coequal branches of government: the 
people cannot serve as a competing source of power if they do not have 
an opportunity to penalize elected officials for failing to support the 
court. In this situation, the threat of noncompliance or punitive 
measures comes from the coordinate branches. In a federal system, 
however, threats of noncompliance could also come from below, as 
there are many outlets for organized political opposition and even 
space for competing legal paradigms (subnational constitutions).360 
 
 356. See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 921 (2016) (coining the phrase “narrowing from below” to describe efforts by courts of 
appeals to interpret Supreme Court rulings narrowly). 
 357. See Hirschl, Canada’s Contribution, supra note 279, at 96 (“[J]udges are not only 
precedent followers, framers of legal policies, or ideology-driven decision makers, but also 
sophisticated strategic decision makers who realize that their range of decision-making choices is 
constrained by the preferences and anticipated reactions of the surrounding political sphere.”). 
 358. See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text.  
 359. Cf. generally Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Design Two Ways: Constitutional Drafters 
as Judges, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016) (highlighting the appointment of constitutional 
drafters as judges, noting their significant political backgrounds and connections, and exploring 
their efficacy in enforcing young constitutions). 
 360. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1779–86 (2005); 
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2180, 2219 n.181 (“[S]tates are structurally better protected from federal overreaching than 
any discrete group of individuals, even a political majority, because their existing organization 
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Here, courts may need to prioritize a positive relationship with the 
coequal branches of government to ensure that the executive branch is 
willing to enforce the court’s word against the sub-national entities.361 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates that courts around the world avoid 
contentious aspects of cases and that avoidance can occur at various 
times and with varying levels of candor. These choices—timing and 
candor—may affect the quality and nature of dialogue that a court can 
have with the political branches. But the decision to avoid may come 
with unintended consequences. Ultimately, how a court avoids an issue 
may also implicate the court’s own effectiveness: the institutional or 
sociological legitimacy that the court is seeking to maintain or increase 
through delay may come at the expense of the court’s own scope of 
authority. 
 
facilitates political action.”). The role of elites and interest groups in fomenting backlash is 
relevant to this point. See Persily, supra note 289, at 3, 12.  
 361. Roux, supra note 237, at 113 (describing political scientists who “counsel courts to ensure 
their decisions fall within the political branches’ ‘tolerance interval’ for every case that they 
decide”). 
